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I. INTRODUCTION
Covenants not to compete, or non-competition covenants, have en-
gendered a multitude of cases and commentaries.' Four decades ago,
an often-quoted decision2 recognized the "vast and vacillating, over-
lapping and bewildering" sea of authority on the subject.3 Even more
law exists now,4 and the issues are so diverse that a comprehensive
analysis of restrictive covenants may serve little purpose. Recognizing
this complexity, several commentators have addressed the subject in
limited contexts where replicable rules can be identified more readily
and suggestions for improvement carry greater weight.5
This Article analyzes the relevance and validity of covenants not to
1. For commentaries on the subject, see, e.g., Jordan Leibman & Richard Nathan,
The Enforceability of Post-Employment Noncompetition Agreements Formed Af-
ter At-Will Employment Has Commenced The "Afterthought" Agreement, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1465 (1987); William H. White, "Common Callings" and the Enforce-
ment of Postemployment Covenants in Texas, 19 ST. MARY's L.J. 589 (1988); Su-
san E Corisis, Case Note, Postemployment Restrictive Covenants: Client Base
Protection in Washington-Perry v. Moran, 65 WASH. L. REV. 209 (1990); John
Reid Parker, Jr., Note, Injunctive Russian Roulette and Employment Noncompe-
tition Cases: A.E.P. Industries, Inc. v. McClure, 63 N.C. L. REV. 222 (1984). Nu-
merous cases are collected at 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and
Unfair Trade Practices §§ 522-531, 542-564 (1971 & Supp. 1990).
2. Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio C. P. 1952).
3. The often-quoted language follows:
This is not one of those questions on which the legal researcher cannot
find enough to quench his thirst. To the contrary there is so much au-
thority it drowns him. It is a sea-vast and vacillating, overlapping and
bewildering. One can fish out of it any kind of strange support for any-
thing, if he lives so long.
Id. at 687.
4. The authors collected over 300 such decisions in a routine computer search span-
ning the years 1980 to 1991.
5. See, eg., Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics
of Grabbing and Leaving, 67 Tsx. L. REV. 1 (1988); Stuart L. Pachman, Account-
ants and Restrictive Covenants: The Client Commodity, 13 SETON HALL L. REv.
312 (1983); Kevin M. Kelly, Comment, Drafting Enforceable Covenants Not to
1992]
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compete among veterinarians. Because the subject has received signif-
icant analysis in the context of physician contracts, 6 this Article will
address only the particular justifications for, and limitations on, the
use of covenants not to compete in veterinary medicine. Although vet-
erinarians are a relatively small proportion of the various medical pro-
fessionals, 7 a significant number of veterinarians are affected by
covenants not to compete.
This Article will first discuss the relevance of non-competition
agreements in veterinary medicine and their pervasiveness in the pro-
fession. Next, it will discuss how the common law has approached
covenants not to compete, with greater attention given to the aspects
most relevant to veterinary covenants. Third, the Article will address
the impact of state statutes and federal antitrust legislation on the va-
lidity of veterinary covenants. Finally, a brief conclusion will suggest
some improvements for dealing with covenants in this area.
II. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE IN VETERINARY
MEDICINE
Covenants not to compete reflect the importance of protecting
one's proprietary interest in information or knowledge. The nature of
this interest varies with the specific profession or trade. Among veter-
inary practitioners, the primary focus of protection is the interest in
preserving client relationships, or "goodWill."s Other protectable in-
Compete in Author-Publisher Agreements Under New York Law, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 119 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Michael G. Getty, Commentary, Enforceability of Noncompetition Cove-
nants in Physician Employment Contracts, 7 J. LEG. MED. 235 (1986); Jill Moore
Mayo, Comment, The Antitrust Ramifications of Non-Competition Clauses in the
Partnership and Employment Agreements of Doctors, 30 Loy. L. REv. 307 (1984).
See also Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contrac-
tual Restrictions on Right of Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to Sale of
Practice, 62 A.L.R. 3D 918 (1975 & Supp. 1990); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation,
Validity and Construction of Contractual Restrictions on Right of Medical Prac-
tioner to Practice, Incident to Partnership Agreement, 62 A.L.R. 3D 970 (1975 &
Supp. 1990); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Con-
tractual Restrictions on Right of Medical Practioner to Practice, Incident to Em-
ployment Agreement, 62 A.L.R. 3D 1014 (1975 & Supp. 1990).
7. The American Veterinary Medical Association estimates that there are 46,342
veterinarians in the United States. J. Karl Wise, Economic Note: 1990 Biennial
Economic Survey: Population and Sample Demographics, 198 J. Am. VETERI-
NARY MED. Ass'N 690, 690 (1991). In contrast, the American Medical Association
lists the number of practicing physicians in the United States at 546,243, with
another 67,227 in residency programs. Telephone Interview with A. Stewart, Se-
nior Research Associate, Dept. of Membership Information Services, American
Medical Association (Aug. 9, 1991).
8. "Goodwill" may be defined as:
the favor or advantage in the way of custom that a business has acquired
beyond the mere value of what it sells whether due to the personality of
[Vol. 71:826
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terests also exist.9
Veterinary medicine is a client-oriented profession. Therefore, the
success of a practicelO depends greatly on its ability to attract and re-
tain clients. Much of a practice's ability to attract clients initially de-
pends on its reputation within the community." This reputation,
along with the effects of location and staff, constitute what is com-
monly termed "practice goodwill."'12 Practice goodwill is often the ini-
tial impetus for many clients' decisions to visit the practice.'3 Practice
goodwill also benefits the staff at the clinic by improving their reputa-
tion in the community through association with the practice. But
although the individual members of a veterinary practice's staff con-
tribute to the formation of practice goodwill, the proprietary interest
in this form of goodwill normally rests with the practice.' 4
Although attracting new clients is important for the success of any
veterinary practice, retaining existing clients is considered the most
important factor in maintaining a successful practice.15 Client reten-
those conducting it, the nature of its location, its reputation for skill or
promptitude, or any other circumstance incidental to the business and
tending to make it permanent.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICrIoNARY 979 (1961). One author de-
fines goodwill, in the context of valuation of a veterinary practice, as "the capital-
ization of excess earnings." Owen E. McCafferty, How to Price Your Practice
(Part 2), VETERINARY ECON., Sept. 1987, at 62, 69.
9. See infra notes 36-86 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of
the various protectable interests.
10. The authors use the term "practice" for the entity providing veterinary services.
The practice may be owned by a single veterinarian, a partnership, or a corpora-
tion. Distinctions based on the form of ownership are irrelevant for the purposes
of this discussion.
11. See Stephan R. Leimberg, Putting a Price on the Practice, BEST'S REvIEW-LiE-
HEALTH INsURANcE EDITION, July 1987, at 62, 64 ("trust, respect and the likability
of the practitioner are crucial to the success of the practice"). As a further exam-
ple of the importance of reputation or goodwill in veterinary practice, a standard
rule of thumb for calculating a veterinary practice's goodwill is to compute 60 to
90 percent of the practice's annual revenue. Id. at 105. For other professions,
such as medicine and dentistry, the figures are 20 to 40 percent and 30 to 40 per-
cent, respectively. Id.
12. Id. at 64.
13. Other factors, such as proximity and cost, play an important role in client deci-
sions as well.
14. See Owen E. McCafferty, How to Price Your Practice (Part 3), VETERINARY
ECON., Oct. 1987, at 62, 68 ("An associate may cultivate clients, educate the staff,
and provide medical expertise and management skills, but rarely do employment
contracts credit doctors for their contribution to goodwill.")
15. See eg., Jack Antelyes, Rolling Out the Red Carpet, VETERINARY ECON., Feb. 1990,
at 66, 66 (noting that obtaining new clients costs a practice six times more than
retaining existing ones). See also John Lofflin, How to Reverse Fading Client
Support, VETERINARY EcoN., Feb. 1986, at 38 (offering ten suggestions for retain-
ing clients and maintaining income despite a decline in client base); James Mc-
Bride, Keep Your Clients Coming Back, VETERINARY ECON., July 1986, at 42
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tion rests primarily with the practice's ability to satisfy client needs
and develop loyalty among its clients. Thus a practice depends on the
individual practitioner's ability to foster strong veterinarian-client re-
lationships (that is, his or her "professional goodwill").
The veterinarian-client relationship is a one-to-one relationship,
based on trust and open communication. Clients often prefer to have
their animals examined by a particular veterinarian, 16 a preference
that stems largely from the client's perception of the individual vet-
erinarian's competence. This perception, however, rarely correlates
with the practitioner's true medical competence. A client rarely wit-
nesses the indicators, such as surgical skill or ability to diagnose accu-
rately and develop a successful therapeutic regimen, that reveal a
practitioner's true medical competence.1 7 Moreover, clients often can-
not appreciate the significance of given diagnostic or therapeutic re-
gimes or the knowledge required to interpret them. Instead, clients
base their decision on superficial, non-medical criteria, such as how
the animals respond to the veterinarian and vice versa or the vet-
erinarian's ability to perform minor, technical procedures like draw-
ing blood or giving a dog a pill. Few, if any, of these activities really
demonstrate the practitioner's medical or surgical competence. Be-
cause the activities performed in the client's presence provide the only
basis on which the client can form an opinion, however, the veterinar-
ian should perform them proficiently.1S
A veterinarian can affect client perceptions in other ways as well.
For example, a veterinarian with a cordial, empathetic personality
may be able to console a client in the face of tragedy or a bleak progno-
sis. 19 A veterinarian may also enhance client relations with marketing
strategies, such as follow-up calls, to demonstrate concern for clients
and their animals. In addition, advanced or specialized training will
enable the veterinarian to serve the needs of clients and patients more
(offering nine suggestions for practitioners to increase client satisfaction and
loyalty).
16. See generally Leimberg, supra note 11, at 62.
17. Most medical and surgical procedures take place out of the client's view for many
reasons, but primarily to reduce animal and client stress.
18. In addition to the medical and clinical information provided to practicing veteri-
narians, a great deal of literature is dedicated to building and strengthening vet-
erinarian-client relations. See, e.g., Jacob Antelyes, Difficult Clients in the Next
Decade, 198 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 550 (1991)(concerning the need to
accommodate demanding or otherwise difficult clients); Steve Beale, Mhen Your
Associate Loses a Client, VETERINARY ECON., July 1987, at 18; Lofflin, supra note
15; McBride, supra note 15.
19. See Gina Lee, How Clients Choose Clinics, VETERINARY ECON., Oct. 1987, at 70
(discussing client's perspective about what is important in a veterinary practice);
McBride, supra note 15 (offering suggestions for practitioners to increase client
satisfaction and loyalty).
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effectively.20 In these ways, the veterinarian provides the client with
an indication, albeit sometimes minor, of overall medical competence.
All of these personal attributes combine to form the individual
practitioner's "professional goodwill."21 Unlike practice goodwill, pro-
fessional goodwill develops mainly from the individual veterinarian's
efforts, and it primarily benefits that veterinarian. Professional good-
will often leads to strong loyalty from clients. This loyalty also bene-
fits the practice, because it helps to establish practice goodwill.
Thus, both practice goodwill and professional goodwill combine to
create an overall "client goodwill" that constitutes one of the most im-
portant assets in a veterinary practice.2 2 When a veterinarian leaves a
practice, clients may prefer to continue working with the departing
doctor at a new practice or to find a new practice altogether, if their
veterinarian has left the area. Thus, the risk exists that a veterinar-
ian's departure will decrease client goodwill, not only by loss of the
doctor's own professional goodwill, but also by reducing the value of
the remaining practice goodwill. When a popular veterinarian leaves
a practice, the remaining veterinarians will need to preserve client
goodwill. This need increases in importance in light of recent evi-
dence suggesting that more veterinarians will be competing for fewer
client dollars.23
The primary mechanism for protecting client goodwill in veteri-
nary medicine is the covenant not to compete. Though no studies doc-
ument the prevalence of non-competition covenants in veterinary
medicine, anecdotal as well as circumstantial evidence suggests that
these covenants are common.24
20. Board-certified specialists are veterinarians who have received advanced training
and education in a particular field of veterinary medicine. Currently 18 specialty
boards exist, overseeing 23 specialties, including internal medicine, surgery, anes-
thesiology, and cardiology. AMERIcAN VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION Di-
REcTORY 657-93 (1990).
21. Leimberg, supra note 11, at 64.
22. See e.g., Harvey Sarner, Sale and Lease of a Small Animal Practice, 2 VETERI-
NARY CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA, Sept. 1972, at 503, 504-07 (discussing goodwill
valuation for tax purposes and protection through the covenant not to compete).
23. Current studies indicate that the amount of discretionary income available to
animal owners for their animal's health care has declined, and the number of
veterinarians competing for this income has increased. Antelyes, supra note 18,
at 550.
24. The anecdotal evidence is based on numerous conversations with veterinarians
who planned to execute an employment contract with a restrictive covenant or
draft a contract with such a provision. Further evidence of the widespread use of
restrictive covenants can be found in literature devoted to the subject in veteri-
nary journals and texts. See, e.g., JAMES F. WILSON, LAW AND ETHICS OF THE
VETERINARY PROFESSION 205-13 (1988); Ellen Bleiler, Will a Restrictive Covenant
Hold Up Today?, VETERINARY ECON., May 1986, at 31; Harold W. Hannah, Non-
competition Agreements and the Veterinary Profession, 170 J. AM. VETERINARY
MED. ASS'N 134 (1977), reprinted in LEGAL BRIEFS 177 (1986); Harold W. Hannah,
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Covenants not to compete normally arise in one of three contexts:
a contract for the sale of a practice, a partnership agreement, or an
employment contract.25 In each situation, the primary motivation for
the covenant is to protect practice goodwill. 26 Secondary motivations,
such as protecting trade secrets or unique skills, may exist and will be
discussed below.27 Legal rules governing covenants not to compete
vary from state to state and will be the subject of the remainder of this
article. The common law; state statutes specifically regulating cove-
nants not to compete, as well as other state antitrust legislation; and
federal antitrust legislation all play some role in determining the va-
lidity of covenants not to compete.
III. THE COMMON-LAW APPROACH
Since the early fifteenth century, judges have been asked to decide
about the enforceability of covenants not to compete.28 In ensuing
centuries, courts have attempted to define the appropriate standard of
Statutory Bars to Noncompetition Agreements, 191 J. AM. VETERINARY MED.
ASS'N 766 (1987); Harold W. Hannah, Covenants not to compete-ten questions,
200 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 38 (1992).
An ethical principle also supports covenants not to compete:
The records of a veterinary facility are the sole property of that facility,
and when a veterinarian leaves salaried employment therein, the depart-
ing veterinarian shall not copy, remove, or make any subsequent use of
those records.
AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF VETERINARY MED-
ICAL ETHICS, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 5 (1989)(emphasis
added).
25. Harold W. Hannah, More About Restrictive Covenants, 182 J. AM. VETERINARY
MED. ASS'N 1186 (1983), reprinted in LEGAL BRIEFS 136 (1986).
26. See, e.g., Durio v. Johnson, 358 P.2d 703, 705 (N.M. 1961)(recognizing that "good
will also exists in professional practice, or in business founded upon personal skill
and reputation and is salable."); Harold W. Hannah, Sale of a Veterinary Prac-
tice, 192 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 1496, 1496 (1988) ("If there is any doubt
whatsoever about the future intentions of the seller with respect to practice in
the locality, the buyer should insist that the contract include a covenant against
competition .... ).
27. See infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text.
28. The English court of common pleas refused to enforce a six-month restraint on a
dyer-apprentice in Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414). Most
courts and commentators have interpreted this decision to hold that all restraints
were void without regard to whether the restraint was reasonable. See Harlan M.
Blake, Employee Agreements not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv. 625, 636-37 (1960).
This overly protective view eventually gave way to the "rule of reason" as stated
in Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711), where the
Queen's Bench recognized the need for reasonable restraints in order to protect
economic expectations. Id. at 182, 186, 24 Eng. Rep. at 348, 349. Mitchel formed
the basis for the current common-law approach to non-competition covenants.
Blake, supra, at 637. For a thorough discussion of the economic and social cli-
mates that shaped the English and American courts' views of covenants not to
compete from the 1400s to the 1900s, see Blake, supra, at 629-46.
[Vol. 71:826
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review for these covenants, but a consistent, workable standard has
proven difficult to formulate. In general, courts do not favor re-
straints of trade and therefore review restrictive covenants rather rig-
orously. Though each case is normally analyzed on its facts, several
guidelines have evolved.
Courts in different jurisdictions have formulated the standard of
review in a variety of ways.29 Broadly speaking, however, the primary
issues raised by a covenant not to compete are whether the covenant is
reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate interest of the covenantee
and whether it reasonably protects that interest without unfairly bur-
dening the covenantor or the public.30 In addition, the covenant must
be ancillary to a valid contract and supported by consideration.31
A. The Protectable Interest
When a court evaluates a covenant not to compete, the most impor-
tant issue may be whether the covenantee possesses an identifiable,
legitimate interest that justifies imposing a restraint.3 2 In the absence
of an interest deserving protection, no covenant, whether reasonably
drafted or not, should be enforced. Some courts, however, have fo-
cused on the reasonableness of the covenant's scope without first in-
quiring into the justification for the covenant itself.33 Others have
assumed that a legitimate interest supported the covenant merely be-
cause of the nature of the relationship between covenantor and
29. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Communications, Inc. v. Greenwell, 555 N.E.2d 525, 528 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1990)("covenant will be enforced if it is reasonable, is ancillary to the
main purpose of a lawful contract, and is necessary to protect the covenantee in
the enjoyment of the legitimate benefits of the contract or to protect the cove-
nantee from the dangers of unjust use of those benefits by the covenantor"); Pol-
lack v. Calimag, 458 N.W.2d 591, 598 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 461
N.W.2d 444 (Wis. 1990)(holding that a valid covenant must "(1) be necessary for
the protection of the employer or principal; (2) provide a reasonable time restric-
tion; (3) provide a reasonable territorial limit; (4) not be harsh or oppressive to
the employee; and (5) not be contrary to public policy.")(citing Fields Found.,
Ltd. v. Christensen, 309 N.W.2d 125, 128 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)).
30. Michael J. Hutter, Drafting Enforceable Employee Non-Competition Agreements
to Protect Confidential Business Information: A Lawyer's Practical Approach to
the Case Law, 45 ALB. L. REv. 311, 318-19 (1981).
31. See Nalle Clinic Co. v. Parker, 399 S.E.2d 363, 365 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied,
407 S.E.2d 538 (N.C. 1991).
32. Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current
Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants not to Compete-A Proposal for
Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 541-42 and passim (1984)(reasoning that agency
principles more adequately protect covenantee interests and avoid occupational
bans).
33. Id. at 544. See also Nalle Clinic Co. v. Parker, 399 S.E.2d 363, 365 (N.C. Ct. App.),
review denied, 407 S.E. 2d 538 (N.C. 1991)(requiring a valid covenant to be:
"(1) in writing, (2) made part of a contract of employment, (3) based upon rea-
sonable consideration, (4) reasonable both as to time and territory, and (5) not
against public policy").
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covenantee. 34
Over the years, courts have recognized three basic interests as pro-
tectable: customer (or client) relationships or "goodwill"; trade secrets
or other confidential information; and, in the context of employment
relationships, unique attributes or skills possessed by an employee.35
1. Client Relationships or "Goodwill"
In veterinary contracts, the covenantee's interest in maintaining
customer relationships or goodwill is the most important of the poten-
tial interests that justify imposing a covenant. This interest in cus-
tomer goodwill depends more on the relationship between the
covenantor and covenantee than do the remaining two interests. Rela-
tionships between the veterinarian parties to a covenant will normally
be characterized as vendor-vendee, partnership, or employment.36 In
each of these relationships, goodwill constitutes a protectable interest.
Nonetheless, many courts distinguish between protecting goodwill in
the context of sale of a practice or dissolution of a partnership and
protecting goodwill in the context of an employment contract.
a. Sale of a Veterinary Practice
In the sale of a veterinary practice, client goodwill constitutes an
intangible capital asset capable of transfer for valuable considera-
tion.37 Thus, for a covenant incident to the sale of a practice, the legit-
imate interest is "the buyer's need to protect the value of the good will
that he has acquired."38 Otherwise, in a profession where client good-
will constitutes a major asset,39 nothing would prevent a selling vet-
erinarian from establishing a new practice nearby and re-acquiring the
goodwill that the veterinarian had already sold.40
Because goodwill constitutes such an important component in the
sale of a business, courts rarely inquire into whether a protectable in-
terest exists, presuming its presence from the mere existence of the
transaction.4 1 Not all sales actually involve goodwill, however, and an
34. Retina Services, Ltd. v. Garoon, 538 N.E.2d 651, 653 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied,
545 N.E.2d 130 (Ill. 1989)("The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld cov-
enants not-to-compete in medical practice cases without making a specific inquiry
into whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a protectable business interest.").
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmts. b, g (1979).
36. Closius & Schaffer, supra note 32, at 531 n.1. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 188(2)(1979); Blake, supra note 28, at 626 n.3.
37. Sarner, supra note 22, at 504-05. See also Leimberg, supra note 11, at 64.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. f (1979).
39. See supra text accompanying notes 8-27.
40. See 6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1393 (1962). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. f (1979).
41. See, e.g., Western Media, Inc. v. Merrick, 727 P.2d 547, 549 (Mont. 1986)("Where
the seller of a business agrees in connection with the sale not to engage in the
[Vol. 71:826
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appraisal of the interests in the disputed relationship should be part of
every judicial analysis.
b. Partnership Agreement
Similarly, a partnership agreement providing that the goodwill of a
practice will remain with one of the partners on dissolution or termi-
nation of the partnership also requires some form of protection for the
acquiring partner.42 Open competition among former partners after
the partnership has ended would make worthless any consideration
paid for the practice goodwill. As a first step, however, it must be es-
tablished that goodwill actually exists in a specific partnership agree-
ment. Not every partnership involves goodwill, as the following
Michigan case demonstrates.
In Boggs v. Couturier,4 3 a veterinarian employer entered a limited
partnership with his employee. 4 In exchange for capital contribu-
tions to the partnership, the employee received a 24 percent interest in
the practice as limited partner; the employer became general partner.
The partnership agreement contained a non-competition clause: on
termination or dissolution of the partnership "neither of the parties
shall engage in a like or similar business within fifteen (15) miles of
the present location and for a period of three (3) years from the date
of such termination or dissolution."45 The clause provided, however,
that the general partner (former employer) could continue his prac-
tice at the partnership premises and retain the clinic name and tele-
phone number.46 After three years, the limited partner gave notice of
withdrawal from the partnership, and the general partner sued to en-
force the covenant not to compete. In the court of appeals, the only
issue was the lawfulness of the covenant. Michigan law prohibited
agreements and contracts in restraint of trade, but a statutory excep-
tion applied in the case of a sale of a business or its goodwill.47 Thus,
the existence of goodwill was critical to validity of the covenant. On
same business in the same place, the obvious intent of the seller is to transfer the
goodwill of the business."). See also South Bay Radiology Medical Assocs. v.
Asher, 269 Cal. Rptr. 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)(finding compensation for goodwill
was not required in order to enforce a covenant not to compete against a with-
drawing partner).
42. See, e.g., Durio v. Johnson, 358 P.2d 703 (N.M. 1961)(acknowledging that goodwill
benefits the partners in a veterinary practice).
43. 321 N.W.2d 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
44. Id. at 795.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. McH. COMP. LAws §§ 445.761, 445.766. The statutes prohibited "all agreements
and contracts in restraint of trade" except for agreements "to protect the vendee,
or transferee, of a... business, or the good will thereof ..." Boggs v. Couturier,
321 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). See infra notes 196-241 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of statutes that alter the common-law approach.
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the facts of the case, the court held that the dissolution of the partner-
ship did not involve a transfer of the defendant's goodwill. The de-
fendant, a new veterinary graduate, had no goodwill to sell. Instead,
the compensation paid to the defendant was a return of his original
capital investment. In the absence of goodwill, the covenant not to
compete could not be enforced.48
Although most partnership relationships, like sales of veterinary
practices, would normally involve a legitimate interest in protecting
client goodwill, Boggs indicates that not all transactions of this type
present a justifiable basis for enforcing a covenant not to compete.
Therefore, where the basis for a covenant not to compete rests on the
protection of goodwill, the transaction must be analyzed to determine
whether goodwill has actually been transferred.
c. Employment Contract
More difficult issues involving goodwill arise in employment rela-
tionships. In professional practices, client goodwill has two elements:
practice goodwill and professional goodwill.49 In the employment re-
lationship, the employee gains the benefit of the practice goodwill in
developing his or her professional career, and the practice benefits
from the professional goodwill that the employee creates while associ-
ated with the practice. Though conceptually distinguishable, these
two elements are difficult to separate in practice. The distinction is
important for employees, because employees do not normally intend
to relinquish the right to gain from their own professional goodwill, as
those who sell practices or terminate veterinary partnerships some-
times do.50
Simply stated, the issue in employment contracts with covenants
not to compete is who actually owns the employee's professional good-
will. If employees own their professional goodwill, then they should
be allowed to take that goodwill with them when they leave. On the
other hand, if the employer owns both practice and professional good-
48. Specifically, the court stated:
Rather, all the good will in the clinic remained with plaintiff who began
using the name Clay-Mar Veterinary Clinic when he commenced his
practice in 1969; defendant did not become a partner in the clinic until
1976. The partnership agreement gave the plaintiff, upon dissolution of
the partnership, the privilege of remaining in the present location of the
partnership business under the name of Clay-Mar Veterinary Clinic and
the use of the clinic's telephone number. There was, therefore, no good
will linked to the defendant's participation in the partnership which he
could transfer to the plaintiff upon dissolution.
Id. at 797. Moreover, the defendant's transfer of his partnership interest was not
the sale of a business, but merely retrieval of his capital contribution. So the
"sale of a business" exemption also failed to apply. I&L at 798.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 10-23.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 135-153 regarding consideration.
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will, employees should be foreclosed from using either for their own
benefit. The argument for employer ownership of goodwill asserts
that "under traditional agency concepts, any new business or improve-
ment in customer relations attributable to [the employee] during his
employment is for the sole benefit of the principal."5 ' Some courts
have found this argument convincing.52 The contrary argument is
that to deprive an employee of the goodwill gained while working for
the employer unfairly restricts the employee's freedom of employ-
ment.53 This debate is particularly significant in the context of profes-
sional employment, where it is extremely difficult to distinguish
practice goodwill from professional goodwill.
Despite the conceptual distinction, courts have apparently recog-
nized the practical difficulty of separating the two forms of goodwill.
Thus, most courts do not make the distinction and instead hold that
client goodwill, in whatever form, constitutes a protectable interest
that supports a covenant not to compete.54 For example, in Cockerill
v. Wilson,55 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a veterinarian em-
ployer had a legitimate interest in preventing his clients from being
taken over by his former employee.56 The court focused on the em-
ployer's right to prevent the former employee from taking clients he
had established over the years, and not on the employee's interest in
the clientele by virtue of his own professional goodwill. The court
stated clearly, "[t]he protection of this asset [client goodwill] is recog-
nized as a legitimate interest of an employer."57 Based on this lan-
guage and the court's approach in other cases involving physicians,5 8
an Illinois appellate court stated that "[t]he Illinois Supreme Court
has repeatedly upheld covenants not-to-compete in medical practice
cases without making a specific inquiry into whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated a protectable business interest."59
A more reasoned judicial approach would avoid presuming good-
51. Blake, supra note 28, at 654. Blake here discusses customer relationships in light
of agency concepts.
52. See, e.g., United Labs. Inc. v. Kuykendall, 370 S.E.2d 375, 382 (N.C. 1988)("When
an employee, during the course of his or her employment, develops or improves
customer relationships, the employee is establishing business good will, which is a
valuable asset of the employer .... ).
53. Corisis, supra note 1, at 212. See also Blake, supra note 28, at 654-55.
54. See, ag., Moore v. Dover Veterinary Hosp., 367 A.2d 1044, 1048 (N.H. 1976)(em-
ployment contract).
55. 281 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. 1972).
56. Id. at 651.
57. id.
58. Canfield v. Spear, 254 N.E.2d 433 (IMI. 1969); House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 225
N.E.2d 21 (1ll. 1967); Bauer v. Sawyer, 134 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 1956).
59. Retina Servs., Ltd. v. Garoon, 538 N.E.2d 651, 653 (Ill. App. Ct.), review denied,
545 N.E.2d 130 (IM. 1989).
1992]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
will exists without first confirming it.60 The nature of the relationship
is relevant for purposes of determining what constitutes the protect-
able interest. Nonetheless, a court should not assume that a legitimate
interest exists merely because the parties belong to a class of individu-
als who traditionally require restrictive covenants in their transac-
tions. Analyzing the nature of the relationship between covenantee
and covenantor is significant both for covenants in partnerships or the
sale of a business and for covenants in employment agreements.
2. Trade Secrets or Confidential Information
A second justification for seeking a covenant not to compete arises
from the need to protect trade secrets or other confidential informa-
tion.61 A trade secret is defined as "any formula, pattern, device, or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives [its owner] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competi-
tors who do not know or use it."62 Confidential information, in con-
trast, often fails to reach the level of trade secrets but nonetheless
deserves protection.63 Confidential information is often closely associ-
ated with customer goodwill. The key factor in determining whether
a business matter is a trade secret or confidential information is the
extent to which the holder of the information seeks to protect it from
disclosure to the public.
In determining whether information is a trade secret, or even con-
fidential information, the courts commonly rely on the six factors ar-
ticulated in the Restatement of Torts:64
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside [the covenantee's]
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others in-
volved in [the covenantee's] business; (3) the extent of measures taken by [the
covenantee] to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the infor-
mation to [the covenantee] and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or
money expended by [the covenantee] in developing the information; (6) the
ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.6 5
60. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
61. Hutter, supra note 30, at 322-26.
62. Id. at 322 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)).
63. Hutter, supra note 30, at 325.
64. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS does not include a section on the misappropriation of trade secrets, but
courts continue to use the rule as stated in the first RESTATEMENT. Closius &
Schaffer, supra note 32, at 536 n.26. See, e.g., Network Telecommunications, Inc.
v. Boor-Crepeau, 790 P.2d 901, 903 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990)(citing factors listed in
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS).
65. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). See also Closius & Schaffer, supra
note 32, at 536. In addition to the common law treatment of trade secrets, legisla-
tures in several states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 433
(1990). How this legislation has affected the judicial analysis of covenants not to
compete is beyond the scope of this article. The primary impact of this legislation
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Factors as broad as these can encompass a number of types of informa-
tion, ranging from technology to customer lists. 6 6 They do not, how-
ever, seem to apply to information belonging to employees as a result
of knowledge and skill acquired during employment. This omission
becomes particularly important for employees in the medical
professions.
Medical knowledge, per se, does not constitute a trade secret. Most
veterinarians acquire their knowledge during their veterinary educa-
tion or from advanced training. Even knowledge and skill acquired
while in the covenantee's employ would belong to the employee. 67
Moreover, treating medical knowledge as a trade secret would violate
ethical rules relating to the dissemination of medical knowledge
throughout the profession.68
Another type of information that might qualify as a trade secret or
confidential information is business information such as marketing
strategies or client education programs, which may help a practice at-
tract and maintain clients. Misappropriation of this information could
inflict economic harm on the practice. The ethical rules that require
dissemination of medical knowledge69 probably do not apply to busi-
ness or marketing information. Moreover, the existence of significant
literature on marketing strategies in veterinary medicine today7 O
makes it unlikely that ordinary business information of a practice
would constitute confidential business information.
Customer lists may qualify as protectable information. Although
customer lists have generally not been considered trade secrets,71
appears to be in the treatment of customer lists. For a more detailed analysis on
this point, see Henry J. Silberberg & Eric G. Lardiere, Eroding Protection of Cus-
tomer Lists and Customer Information Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 42
Bus. LAw. 487 (1987).
66. See Closius & Schaffer, supra note 32, at 536; Hutter, supra note 30, at 322-23.
67. See, ag., Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group, 798 S.W.2d 346, 351 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1990) (advanced subspecialties acquired by radiologist not trade secrets in
that no one else in practice group possessed this knowledge nor was the knowl-
edge acquired by way of confidences expressed by any member of the practice),
rev'd on other grounds, 802 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1991).
68.
Veterinarians should strive continually to improve veterinary knowl-
edge and skill, making available to their colleagues the benefit of their
professional attainments, and seeking, through consultation, assistance
of others when it appears that the quality of veterinary service may be
enhanced thereby.
PRINCIPLES OF VETERINARY MEDICAL ETHcs, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JU-
DICIAL COUNCIL 3 (1989)(emphasis added).
69. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
70. For example, each monthly issue of Veterinary Economics (the "magazine of
practice management and finance") has a department focusing on marketing.
Feature articles, too, focus on marketing techniques. E.g., Jingle Davis, Casting
for Clients, VETERINARY ECON., Nov. 1987, at 42.
71. E.g., Colorado Supply Co. v. Stewart, 797 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
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courts have treated them as protectable interests if the lists cannot be
compiled except by "extraordinary efforts." 72 The treatment of veter-
inary customer lists as a protectable interest is probably appropriate.
Veterinarians establish their clientele primarily through word of
mouth and reputation, and these efforts are not easily duplicated. Ar-
guably, one could identify pet owners or livestock breeders with rela-
tively little effort by canvassing neighborhoods or attending animal
shows and sales and identifying the relevant client population. Realis-
tically, however, active client lists are closely connected with the prac-
tice's goodwill; in effect, they are evidence of the extent of the
practice's goodwill. Thus, customer lists should be protected to the
extent of the protectable interest in client goodwill.
3. Unique or Special Characteristics of an Employee
Some courts, primarily in New York, have held that an employer
has a legitimate interest in preventing competition from former em-
ployees with unique or special skills that are not trade secrets or confi-
dential information. 73 This interest stems less from an employer's
right to restrict the mobility of employees with unique skills than
from the employer's expectation that a departing employee will not
exercise these special skills for a competitor.74
Courts that recognize this protectable interest take different ap-
proaches in determining what employee skills are unique enough to
warrant enforcing a covenant not to compete.75 It is not generally
enough that the employee "excels at his work" or that the employer
values the employee's services. 76 Instead, the employer must
show that the employee's services "are of such character as to make
his replacement impossible or that the loss of such services would
cause the employer irreparable injury."77 Most reported decisions
in this area have involved employees in the entertainment fields,78 in
72. E.g., AGA Aktiebolag v. ABA Optical Corp., 441 F.Supp. 747, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
See also Closius & Schaffer, supra note 32, at 536 & n.30.
73. E.g., American Broadcasting Cos. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363 (N.Y. 1981); Purchasing
Assocs. v. Weitz, 196 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1963); Hartwell's Office World v. Systex
Corp., 598 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). See also Margaret N. Kniffen, Em-
ployee Noncompetition Covenants: The Perils of Performing Unique Services, 10
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 25 (1978).
74. Kniffen, supra note 73, at 55.
75. Id. at 53-54.
76. Purchasing Assocs. v. Weitz, 196 N.E.2d 245, 249 (N.Y. 1963); see also Kniffen,
supra note 73, at 39.
77. Purchasing Assocs. v. Weitz, 196 N.E.2d 245, 249 (N.Y. 1963).
78. See, e.g., American Broadcasting Cos. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363 (N.Y. 1981)(televi-
sion sportscaster); King Records v. Brown, 252 N.Y.S.2d 988 (N.Y. App. Div.
1964)(recording star); Clooney v. WCPO TV, 300 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio Ct. App.
1973)(radio and television personality).
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sports, 79 or who possess significant responsibility within a company.S0
Covenants imputing unique skills to physicians have been treated
inconsistently.8- No cases addressing this issue in veterinary contracts
have been identified. Moreover, enforcing covenants not to compete
against health professionals with unique skills raises a difficult issue.
As one commentator has argued, when an employee possesses unique
or special skills, a covenant burdens not only the potential competitor,
but also the employee.8 2 In addition, if a productive professional must
leave the community, the public may be burdened. This public burden
is particularly significant in covenants not to compete entered by
health professionals. 8 3 Despite the employer's arguable interest, the
public policy interest in ensuring the availability of unique health care
services may outweigh the need to prevent unfair competition.8 4
Perhaps recognizing this public burden, few recent decisions have
found a protectable interest in unique employee skills. New York re-
mains the primary jurisdiction that recognizes an employee's posses-
sion of unique skills, without more, as a protectable interest.8 5 Other
jurisdictions recognize an interest in protecting unique employee
skills only if the employer had a role in training or educating the
employee.86
79. See, e.g., Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, 515 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Dallas
Cowboys Football Club v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
80. See, e.g., Bradford v. New York Times, 501 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1974)(citing em-
ployee's "broad and vital corporate responsibilities" in the company's circulation,
advertising, production, and promotion departments); Hartwell's Office World v.
Systex Corp., 598 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)(enforcing covenant against
three of the employer's top salesman).
81. See, e.g., Weintraub v. Schwartz, 516 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)(rec-
ognizing that physician employee's practice of neurology may constitute a unique
service but refusing to enforce covenant on grounds that territorial restriction
was too broad); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971). Karpinski did
not address this issue specifically, but later courts have cited it as an example of
applying the unique skills requirement to the learned professions; see Reed, Rob-
erts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976).
82. Kniffen, supra note 73, at 55.
83. See infra text accompanying note 84.
84. See Dick v. Geist, 693 P.2d 1133 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)(refusing to enforce cove-
nant against pediatrician where only two pediatricians practiced within a 25-mile
radius); Williams v. Hobbs, 460 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)(refusing to en-
force covenant against osteopath because osteopath's radiological skills were
unique to the area). See also Kniffen, supra note 73, at 55; text accompanying
infra note 94.
85. E.g., American Broadcasting Cos. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363 (N.Y. 1981); Reed, Rob-
erts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976)(recognizing a protectable
interest in "unique or extraordinary" services, but holding that such a characteri-
zation did not apply to an accountant).
86. See, ag., Torrence v. Hewitt Assocs., 493 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)(enforcing
covenant against attorney who possessed special skills in flexible compensation
plans developed while employed by plaintiff); Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Haschert,
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B. Reasonableness of the Covenant to Protect the Covenantee's Interest
When a court has determined that an employer or other cove-
nantee has a protectable interest, the next assessment is whether the
restraint imposed by the covenant not to compete is reasonably
designed to protect that interest.8 7 This analysis is difficult, and
courts have applied it inconsistently. Nevertheless, the courts look to
a number of separate but interrelated factors, including the relation-
ship among the parties, the geographical area of the restraint, the time
limitation, and the scope of the activity restrained.8 8 Each factor must
be analyzed in light of the interests of the covenantee, the covenantor,
and the public.8 9 A court determines the reasonableness of a covenant
not to compete by considering the factors and interests in the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the particular covenant. For pur-
poses of analysis, however, it is useful to consider each factor
individually.
1. The Relationship among the Parties.
As in the analysis of protectable interests, the relationship among
the parties weighs heavily in the courts' determination of whether a
covenant not to compete is reasonable. When the relationship is the
sale of a practice or formation of a partnership, courts generally con-
sider the parties to be substantially equal in bargaining power.90 Thus,
the covenant not to compete that is included in the contract of sale or
partnership agreement can reflect more accurately the intent of the
parties than a covenant in a situation of less equal bargaining power
(for example, in an employment contract). This presumed equality
means that courts are normally reluctant to overturn covenants in
sale-of-business and partnership agreements. 91
In contrast, courts recognize employment contracts as inherently
suspect because of the employee's unequal position; therefore non-
127 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1955)(enforcing covenant against former employee
who solicited promotional material on behalf of employer).
87. Closius & Schaffer, supra note 32, at 542; Hutter, supra note 30, at 318. In deter-
mining the reasonableness of a covenant, some courts and commentators look to
its effect on each of the following- the covenantee, the covenantor, and the public.
See Getty, supra note 6, at 244 & n.71; Mayo, supra note 6, at 322. See also Karlin
v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161 (N.J. 1978); Booth v. Greer, 363 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. Ct. App.
1977). These considerations may serve more as underlying considerations than
distinct and separate grounds for reviewing a covenant. See Milton Handler &
Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 669, 731-39 (1982). One commentator asserts that in physician
covenants, the interests of the covenantor and the public may play a more distinct
role than in other contexts. Getty, supra, at 244 n.71.
88. Closius & Schaffer, supra note 32, at 542-43; Hutter, supra note 30, at 329.
89. Getty, supra note 6, at 244.
90. Closius & Schaffer, supra note 32, at 531 n.1.
91. Id.
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competition covenants in employment contracts receive stricter scru-
tiny.92 Some courts apply strict scrutiny even to non-competition cov-
enants in employment contracts involving professionals, 9 3 though
professionals negotiating for employment may be slightly less vulner-
able to overreaching than other types of employees. One possible ex-
planation for this protection for professional employees is the public
interest in the availability of professional services.94
2. Geographic Limits
When evaluating whether the geographic scope of a covenant not
to compete is reasonable, courts normally determine whether the re-
straint reasonably protects the covenantee's interest without causing
undue harm to the covenantor or the public. The interrelated nature
of the interests of the covenantee, covenantor, and the public means
that the extent of a reasonable geographic restraint can vary signifi-
cantly with the type of activity restrained.95 In a limited number of
instances, broad geographic restraints may be appropriate. For exam-
ple, when an employee has been involved in all aspects of a competi-
tive national business, a nation-wide restriction on activity may be
reasonable.9 6 Normally, however, much more limited geographic re-
straints will be appropriate.
In the veterinary context in particular, broad territorial limits are
normally inappropriate. Generally, the courts ask whether the terri-
torial restraint encompasses only the area required to protect the cov-
enantee's interest-that is, usually the goodwill of the practice. The
percentage of clients within the territory of the covenant is relevant,
though courts have established no precise guidelines. In Brecher v.
Brown,97 for example, a veterinarian-employer attempted to prevent
his former employee from practicing within a twenty-five-mile radius
of the employer's practice.98 The Iowa Supreme Court held this re-
straint to be unreasonable where only one of the employer's clients
92. See, e.g., Harvest Ins. Agency v. Inter-Ocean Ins., 492 N.E.2d 686, 688 (Ind.
1986)(holding that employer-employee covenants not to compete are reviewed
with stricter scrutiny than covenants not to compete ancillary to the sale of a
business).
93. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins Irrigation, 259 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. 1979); Madison Bank &
Trust v. First National Bank, 635 S.W.2d 268 (Ark. 1982).
94. See supra note 84 for decisions citing this public policy argument.
95. Hutter, supra note 30, at 329-32.
96. E.g., Harwell Enters. v. Heim, 173 S.E.2d 316, 319-20 (N.C. 1970).
97. 17 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1945).
98, Id. at 378 ("[The [employee] will not engage in the practice of veterinary
medicine or surgery, or any competing business to that of [the employer], in
Storm Lake, Iowa, or a territory within a radius of twenty-five miles of Storm
Lake, Iowa. . . .").
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lived at a distance greater than twenty-five miles.99 In Cockerill v.
Wilson,10 0 an Illinois appellate court held that the twenty-mile radius
sought in the plaintiff-veterinarian's amended complaint (reduced
from the thirty-mile radius specified in the contract) was reasonable
where ninety percent of the plaintiff's clients lived within this
twenty-mile area.101
What constitutes a reasonable geographic restraint depends greatly
on the nature of the covenantee's veterinary practice. A veterinary
practice that serves primarily small-animal clients 02 will draw its cli-
ents from a significantly smaller area than a predominantly equine or
large-animal practice.10 3 Moreover, within a practice specialty, the
population density may affect the relevant area of service.104 Thus, in
Cukjati v. Burkett,05 a Texas appellate court held that a twelve-mile
radius from the plaintiff-veterinarian's hospital was "unreasonable
and unnecessary."106 In reaching this conclusion, the court cited evi-
dence that "demonstrates that most pet owners travel only a few miles
to obtain pet care."107 A similar restraint for a large-animal or equine
practitioner is less likely to be unreasonable. Indeed, a covenant at
issue in one reported decision recognized the distinction between dif-
ferent types of practices. That covenant prohibited competition for
99. Id. at 379. The court also found the unlimited time restraint to be unreasonable.
Id.
100. 265 N.E.2d 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971), rev'd in part on other grounds, 281 N.E.2d 648
(Ill. 1972).
101. Id. at 517. See also Lassen v. Benton, 346 P.2d 137, 139 (Ariz. 1959)(although only
10-25 percent of the plaintiff's clients came from the area within 12 miles of the
city limits of Mesa, Arizona, this restraint was not unreasonable).
102. "Small-animal clients" own small companion animals such as dogs, cats, or birds.
Other types of veterinary practice are equine practice (the care and treatment of
horses) and food-animal practice (the care and treatment of animals intended for
human consumption, such as cattle, swine, and sheep).
103. For example, in 1988, equine practitioners served clients who lived a mean radius
of 27 miles from the practice, whereas small-animal practitioners served clients
who lived between 11 and 19 miles from the practice. J. Karl Wise, Economic
Note: Size and Practice Density of Local Veterinary Service Areas, 1988, 195 J.
AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 251, 252 (1989)(table 3). Food-animal practitioners
covered an average radius of 23 to 31 miles. Id.
104. Small-animal practices served areas that varied in mean radii from 17 miles in
rural areas to 8 miles in small suburban areas (between 50,001 and 500,000) and
large cities (greater that 500,000). Id. The areas served by equine practitioners
varied less, id., probably because most horses are stabled in the country, so most
equine veterinarians practiced in the rural areas even if they were near a city.
Population density affected competition from other equine practices. In rural ar-
eas (populations less than 2,500), an average of seven other practices provided
equine medical care; in large cities (population greater than 500,000), an average
of 17 equine practices competed for similar business. Id. (table 4). One can reach
similar conclusions for food-animal practitioners. Id.
105. 772 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
106. Id. at 218.
107. Id. See Texas statute cited at infra note 205.
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five years within a five-mile radius of the former employer for small
animal practice and within a twenty-five-mile radius for equine
practice.108
In addition to the type of animals a veterinary practice treats, other
factors play a role in determining the reasonableness of a covenant's
geographic restraint. For example, whether the practice is a hospital
practice or an ambulatory practice'0 9 relates to the area served, with
ambulatory practices serving larger areas. The population density of
the available client base affects not only the relevant area of service,
but also the amount of competition among similar practices in the
area.1 1 0
In the evaluation of covenants, tension exists between two rela-
tively private interests: the covenantee's right to protect goodwill and
the covenantor's right to practice a profession. In addition, however,
the prevention of disease is a compelling public interest. In human
medical cases, courts look to the public's need for medical services as a
factor in determining whether a geographic restraint is reasonable."'l
Though reported veterinary cases seem to ignore this issue, the vet-
erinarian's role in protecting public health from animal-borne disease
suggests that the public health factor is also relevant in the context of
veterinary covenants not to compete.
3. Time Limits
Time limits are more difficult to evaluate than geographic re-
straints. Courts can look to the area encompassed by a practice to de-
108. Pacific Veterinary Hosp. v. White, 696 P.2d 570 (Or. Ct. App. 1985). The covenant
was held unenforceable because the governing statute prohibited enforcement of
any noncompetition agreement other than one formed at initial employment.
The employee had entered a less onerous (2 years, 2 1/2-mile small animal, 20-
mile equine) agreement at initial employment.
109. In a hospital practice, clients bring their animals to the veterinarian for treat-
ment; this approach predominates in small-animal practice, though it occurs in
other types of practice. In an ambulatory practice, usually an equine or large-
animal practice, the veterinarian provides services on the client's premises.
110. An Arizona Court appeared to miss this fact in Lassen v. Benton, 346 P.2d 137
(Ariz. 1959). In Lassen, the Arizona Supreme court upheld the enforcement of a
covenant not to compete in a veterinarian's employment contract. The covenant
restricted the former employee from practicing within 12 miles of the city limits
of Mesa, Arizona. Id. at 138. Despite the fact that the restricted area encom-
passed Mesa, with a population of 20,000, and "approximately two-thirds of Phoe-
nix, and all of the cities of Scottsdale, Tempe, Chandler, and Gilbert, as well as
Williams Air Force Base," id., the court found the restraint reasonable. Id. at
139-40.
111. See, e.g., Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986)(prohibit-
ing orthopedic surgeon from practicing within 30 miles of Fort Smith, Arkansas
unduly interfered with public interest of having an orthopedic surgeon available);
Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. 1977)(if covenant
were enforced, area would not be left with too few doctors).
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termine if a geographic restraint is reasonable. No such method exists
for time restraints. Courts have stated the rule that when the cove-
nant is designed to protect client goodwill, the time limit will be con-
sidered reasonable "only if it is no longer than necessary for the
employer to put a new [person] on the job and for the new employee to
have a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate his effectiveness to the
customers." 112 Determining what constitutes that "reasonable oppor-
tunity," however, presents the court with a difficult task, particularly
in service professions where a former veterinarian's professional good-
will can survive for a number of years.1 13 In making this determina-
tion, as in assessing geographic restraints, courts consider the interests
of the covenantor, the covenantee, and the public.l14
The nature of the relationship plays a significant role in determin-
ing whether a time limit is reasonable. If the covenant involves the
sale of a business, a covenantor may be restrained from competing for
an indefinite time period, provided the buyer remains in business." 5
In contrast, a covenant between an employee and employer is likely to
be invalid if it continues for an indefinite period of time."16
Another relevant factor is the frequency with which the covenan-
tor came in contact with the clients. At an extreme, when an em-
ployee only contacted clients once every three years, a five-year
limitation would reasonably ensure that all of the employer's clients
become aware that a new employee had been hired.1 7 More frequent
client contact may suggest that a shorter period of restraint is
adequate.
In veterinary cases, few trends can be identified. In Brecher v.
Brown,"18 the Iowa Supreme Court refused to enforce a broad cove-
nant not to compete with an unlimited time restriction." 9 In other
decisions, the Supreme Court of Ohio seemed willing to accept a time
restraint of three years, 2 0 and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
found a five-year covenant not to compete reasonable. 12 ' In upholding
the five-year restraint, the New Hampshire court noted that the "rela-
tionship between a professional and his clients tends to be enduring.
112. Blake, supra note 28, at 677; see also Hutter, supra note 30 at 334.
113. E.g., Moore v. Dover Veterinary Hosp., 367 A.2d 1044, 1048 (N.H. 1976).
114. Hutter, supra note 30, at 332.
115. E.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins Irrigation, 259 S.E.2d 47, 50 (Ga. 1979).
116. E.g., Harvest Ins. Agency v. Inter-Ocean Ins., 492 N.E.2d 686, 690 (Ind. 1986).
117. See, e.g., Chapman & Drake v. Harrington, 545 A.2d 645,648 (Me. 1988)(upholding
five-year restraint on former insurance salesman where relevant policies had
three-year renewal dates).
118. 17 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1945).
119. Id. at 380.
120. E.g., Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio 1975)(remanded for determi-
nation of issue of reasonableness).
121. E.g., Moore v. Dover Veterinary Hosp., 367 A.2d 1044 (N.H. 1976).
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In the instant case, the business entity was closely identified with the
veterinarians who staffed it, and this identification would not soon be
extinguished upon a veterinarian's termination." 2 2 Even in a rather
transient population, the animal hospital's clientele was stable, and
the five-year restraint was a reasonable means of protecting the good-
will of the hospital.
In some situations, a covenant not to compete could be structured
with tiers of protection, through a variable time restraint that restricts
individual types of veterinary activity for different lengths of time.
The parties had taken this approach in Cukjati v. Burkett,12 3 which
involved an employment relationship. The covenant not to compete
imposed a three-year limit on practicing small animal medicine; in ad-
dition, the employee promised not to notify present or past clients of
his former employer about his return to practice at a new location for
a period of five years.12 4 Though the court refused to enforce the cov-
enant, it did so on the grounds that the geographic restraint was un-
reasonable and the covenant was not supported by consideration.125
Despite the holding in this case, a time restraint with tiers of protec-
tion for different activities may be preferable to a flat restraint on all
competitive activity. It would permit covenantors to protect their le-
gitimate interests without oppressing covenantees.
4. Activity Restraints
A covenant not to compete must be limited with respect to the
scope of the covenantor's activity, and it must reasonably protect the
covenantee's interest while not unreasonably burdening the covenan-
tor or the public. Thus the scope of the covenant's restraint must en-
compass only the activity or activities that threaten the covenantee's
protectable interest. If the interest is the goodwill of clients, the re-
striction must prevent competition only for those clients. If the inter-
est is a trade secret, the restraint should proscribe only the
covenantor's use of that trade secret.
Protection of a veterinary employer's interest does not always
mean that the covenantor must cease all local activities related to the
practice of veterinary medicine. In Tench v. Weaver,126 a Wyoming
veterinarian had signed an employment contract in which he agreed
not to "engage in the practice of Veterinary Science or medicine, nor
render any services as Veterinarian for compensation" in the county
for five years. The veterinarian, Tench, subsequently accepted em-
ployment with the U. S. Department of Agriculture, Animal Disease
122. Id. at 1048.
123. 772 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). See infra note 205.
124. Id. at 216.
125. Id. at 218.
126. Tench v. Weaver, 374 P.2d 27, 28 (Wyo. 1962).
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Eradication Service, and worked in the same county in the govern-
ment program for disease eradication. In a counterclaim to Tench's
suit for fees due under the employment contract, Weaver argued that
Tench's employment with U.S.D.A. violated the covenant not to com-
pete. The court rejected Weaver's claim. Under the Wyoming veteri-
nary practice act, Tench's work for U.S.D.A. was not the practice of
veterinary medicine. Nor did Tench render service "for compensa-
tion"; he received a salary, but animal owners paid nothing for testing
and vaccinating under the disease eradication program. Moreover,
Weaver failed to prove that the contract restraint was fair and neces-
sary, nor could he reasonably expect that Tench's government activity
would compete with his business. Tench's U.S.D.A. employment, the
court concluded, did not violate the covenant not to compete.1 2 7
When an employee has worked in a specialized practice, a covenant
not to compete may be unreasonable if it prevents that employee from
post-employment work in a general practice, even in the same geo-
graphic area. A decision involving human dentistry illustrates. In
Karpinski v. Ingrasci,12 8 the plaintiff, an oral surgeon, attempted to
restrain a former employee from practicing "dentistry and/or Oral
Surgery" within a five-county area. 29 The New York Court of Ap-
peals held that the restriction as to the defendant's practice of general
dentistry was overly broad; therefore, the court denied enforcement of
this part of the covenant.130
The Karpinski decision helps to focus the issue, not often ad-
dressed by courts, of the appropriate extent of restraints on activities
in a covenant. When the protection of goodwill is the goal, the re-
straint should be no broader than necessary. To enforce the covenant
as to all forms of veterinary medicine when the covenantor practiced
only a specialty fails to recognize the diversity that has developed
within the veterinary profession.
An Arizona court faced this kind of issue in Lassen v. Benton.131 In
an earlier decision in the same case,' 32 the Arizona Supreme Court
had upheld a covenant that restrained a former small animal em-
ployee from practicing "Veterinary Medicine or establish[ing], or
work[ing] in any small animal hospital."1 33 In a petition for rehearing,
the former employee sought to compete with the former employer's
large-animal practice. He argued that the only services that he had
performed for the employer were in the small-animal practice. The
127. Id. at 28-29.
128. 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971).
129. Id. at 752.
130. Id. at 754. See also Mayo, supra note 6, at 324-25.
131. 347 P.2d 1012 (Ariz. 1959)[hereinafter Lassen 11].
132. Lassen v. Benton, 346 P.2d 137 (Axiz. 1959)[hereinafter Lassen 1].
133. Id. at 138.
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court denied the former employee's request and refused to rewrite the
contract. The court found the covenant controlling by its terms and
not divisible.13 4 Perhaps the court could have reached a different re-
sult with a more artfully drafted covenant not to compete.
5. Additional Factors
Courts have occasionally weighed other factors in determining
whether a covenant not to compete should be enforced. Among these
factors are the existence of consideration for the covenant and the ap-
plicability of any liquidated damages clause.
a. Consideration
A court will enforce a covenant not to compete only if that cove-
nant is supported by consideration. The focus of analysis depends on
whether the covenant accompanies the sale of a business, a partner-
ship agreement, or an employment contract.
Generally, courts do not question the existence of consideration in
the context of a business transfer or partnership agreement, perhaps
because of the clear importance of protecting goodwill in these con-
texts. In the sale of a business, consideration for the covenant not to
compete is presumed when the sale price includes the firm's good-
will. 35 In partnership contracts, too, courts recognize that goodwill
can be transferred. 36 Alternatively, courts analyzing partnership
agreements have found consideration in the form of the partners' re-
ciprocal promises not to compete.13 7 Normally, there is no inquiry
about the adequacy of consideration so long as consideration is pres-
ent. 38 Because challenges on the basis of a lack of consideration
rarely arise in the context of a sale of a business or termination of a
partnership, the following discussion will focus primarily on the issue
of consideration in employment contracts.139
134. Lassen v. Benton, 347 P.2d 1012,1013 (Ariz. 1959)(Lassen II). Concurring justices
would have found the covenant divisible; they believed the restraint from practic-
ing general veterinary medicine to be unreasonable. See infra notes 174-179 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case in the context of divisibility of
covenant terms.
135. See Sarner, supra note 32, at 504-05; Leimberg, supra note 11, at 64.
136. See, e.g., Durio v. Johnson, 358 P.2d 703 (N.M. 1961)(recognizing goodwill as a
transferable asset in a partnership dissolution between two veterinarians).
137. See, e.g., Rash v. Tocca Clinic Medical Assocs., 320 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. 1984)(differen-
tiating covenants in partnership agreements from those in employment contracts
on the grounds that the consideration received for the partner's promise is the
other partner's promise not to compete).
138. See Griffin v. Hunt, 268 P.2d 874 (Okla. 1954).
139. The issue of whether the covenantor received consideration for the covenant not
to compete does not commonly arise in the modern medical cases. Occasionally it
does occur, however. See Newman v. Sablosky, 407 A.2d 448 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979) (sale of a medical practice containing a noncompetitive covenant held not to
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When the covenant not to compete is part of an employment con-
tract, the circumstances surrounding negotiation of the contract will
affect the court's analysis of the consideration issue.140 The timing of
the covenant's execution is especially significant because the covenant
and the consideration must be contemporaneous. If an employee exe-
cutes a covenant not to compete at the time of employment, the con-
sideration and the covenant are contemporaneous. 141 But if the
employee signs a covenant not to compete after the employment rela-
tionship has commenced, the covenant may fail for lack of considera-
tion.1 42 For these post-employment contracts, the issue is whether the
employee received any consideration at the time of execution. In con-
tracts that renew an employment relationship, a majority of courts
hold that continued employment is sufficient consideration. 43
The issue of a post-employment covenant was raised in the 1989
case of Stevenson v. Parsons.4 4 Plaintiff had worked for defendant as
a veterinarian; he signed a covenant not to compete a month after be-
ginning his employment. After leaving defendant's employ, plaintiff
intended to open a veterinary practice (within the ten-mile, five-year
proscription of the covenant) and had contracted to buy real estate for
his clinic. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the post-em-
ployment covenant not to compete in his employment contract was
void for lack of consideration.145 The North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals reversed the trial court's summary judgment for the plaintiff-
employee. The summary judgment was improper because a factual is-
sue existed as to whether the promise not to compete had been made
at the time the veterinarian accepted employment.146 If so, the cove-
nant was supported by consideration, and the mere fact that execution
of the written covenant occurred later would not make it
unenforceable.147
A related problem exists when covenants are executed after com-
be supported by consideration where the contract did not mention goodwill). But
see Griffin v. Hunt, 268 P.2d 874 (Okla. 1954)(court held covenant supported by
consideration where defendant, an employee of the purchased practice, received
$1 in exchange for a non-competition covenant provided to the practice's buyer).
140. See Durio v. Johnson, 358 P.2d 703, 705 (N.M. 1961)(partner's transfer of goodwill
sufficient consideration in exchange for covenant).
141. Hutter, supra note 30, at 337.
142. See, e.g., Daytona Group v. Smith, 800 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
143. Id.
144. 384 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
145. Id. at 292. The declaratory judgment action was proper because an actual contro-
versy existed as to the value of the covenant not to compete, and litigation was
unavoidable. In fact, the defendant employer had already filed a complaint con-
cerning plaintiff's violation of the covenant.
146. Id. at 293.
147. Id.
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mencement of an at-will employment contract.1 48 Courts have not
agreed whether the prospect of indefinite employment in at-will rela-
tionships constitutes sufficient consideration.149 The majority rule
provides that if a covenant is signed prior to, contemporaneous with,
or at any time during the covenantor's employment, the covenant is
considered ancillary to the employment and satisfies the requirement
for consideration.5o In contrast, a minority of states require some
form of additional consideration for the covenant, such as a promotion
or special training.15' In states that do not follow the majority rule,
one commentator recommends that employers who hire at-will em-
ployees establish a bilateral notice period for terminating the employ-
ment.152 This notice period will permit the employment to be
considered one for a term, allowing a court to apply normal considera-
tion requirements to the transaction.153
b. Liquidated Damages Clauses
Liquidated damages provisions in covenants not to compete have
not yet figured prominently in reported veterinary cases, though they
are likely to become more important in the future. 54 Nevertheless,
they occur in other professional contracts,155 and they offer a practical
alternative to broad occupational bans in covenants not to compete. In
effect, liquidated damages clauses provide a substitute remedy for a
covenant not to compete.15S Instead of granting the covenantee a
cause of action for injunctive relief against the covenantor, a liqui-
dated damages clause permits the covenantee to recover a pre-deter-
148. See Kathryn J. Yates, Note, Consideration for Employee Noncompetition Cove-
nants in Employments At Will, 54 FORDHAm L. REv. 1123 (1986).
149. Id. See also Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 380 S.E.2d 922, 925
(1989)(employees who continue at-will employment after signing covenant not to
compete provide sufficient consideration); Mattison v. Johnston, 730 P.2d 286,
288-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
150. Yates, supra note 148, at 1128.
151. Id. at 1133-34.
152. Hutter, supra note 30, at 338.
153. Id.
154. Only one reported decision has addressed a veterinary covenant with a liquidated
damages clause, Friddle v. Raymond, 575 So. 2d 1038 (Ala. 1991), but for statutory
reasons neither the covenant nor that clause was enforceable. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that the use of liquidated damages clauses is increasing.
155. See, e.g., Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 572 A.2d 510 (Md. 1990)(liquidated dam-
ages clause in accountant's contract); Pollack v. Calimag, 458 N.W.2d 591 (Wis. Ct.
App.), review denied, 461 N.W.2d 444 (Wis. 1990)($25,000 liquidated damages pro-
vision in a physician's contract).
156. Courts do not always consider liquidated damages clauses as "substitutes," how-
ever. See, e.g., Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751, 755-56 (N.Y. 1971)(holding
that injunctive relief was not foreclosed simply because a contract containing cov-
enant not to compete included a liquidated damages clause requiring repayment
of $40,000 loan).
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mined sum in the event the covenantor competes in violation of the
terms of the clause.157
When a court is asked to enforce a liquidated damages provision in
connection with a covenant not to compete, the court must perform
two analyses. First, the court must determine whether the covenant
not to compete is enforceable under the common-law requirements
discussed above (for example, legitimate protectable interest, reason-
able geographic and time limits) and whether the covenantor
breached the covenant.15 8 This analysis is appropriate because the liq-
uidated damages clause acts as a substitute for a covenant not to com-
pete. If the terms of a covenant not to compete would be invalid for
purposes of injunctive relief, a liquidated damages clause with similar
terms should also be invalid.
Second, once the court determines that a valid purpose for the cov-
enant and the associated liquidated damages clause exists, it must de-
termine the validity of the damage provision specifically. Generally,
courts require the covenantee to make three showings: the clause rep-
resents an intent to estimate damages rather than to impose a penalty;
the harm caused by a future breach is difficult or impossible to esti-
mate accurately; and the amount specified represents a reasonable es-
timation of anticipated damages.5 9 If these elements can be
established, the court will enforce the provision.
Liquidated damages clauses allow efficient resolution of conflicts
between covenantor and covenantee for two reasons. First, liquidated
damages clauses enhance judicial efficiency by removing from the
courts the difficult task of calculating damages as the result of unfair
competition. 6 0 Second, these clauses allow a covenantee to recover
damages resulting from a covenantor's unfair competition, but they do
not bar the covenantor from competing altogether.l1l And in many
situations, the covenantor's continued right to practice a profession
serves the public interest.
The structure of liquidated damages provisions can be flexible.
157. See cases cited supra note 155.
158. Pollack v. Calimag, 458 N.W.2d 591, 598-99 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 461
N.W.2d 444 (Wis. 1990)(court undertook common-law covenant analysis before
addressing the validity of liquidated damages clause).
159. See, e.g., Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 572 A.2d 510 (Md. 1990); Robbins v.
Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 626 (Utah 1982); Pollack v. Calinag, 458 N.W.2d 591, 600
(Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 461 N.W.2d 444 (Wis. 1990).
160. "[Ain amicable adjustment [by the parties] in advance of difficult issues saves the
time of courts, juries, parties, and witnesses and reduces the delay, uncertainty,
and expense of litigation." Dean Van Horn Consulting Assocs. v. Wold, 395
N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)(quoting Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 99
N.W.2d 69, 74 (Minn. 1959)). See also Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 572 A.2d
510 (Md. 1990).
161. For an example of a liquidated damages clause, see Dean Van Horn Consulting
Assocs. v. Wold, 395 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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Some provisions impose a specific sum as a damage amount;1 6 2 others
require payment of a percentages of fees the covenantor collects from
former clients.163 The fairest approach to both parties may be to as-
sess damages according to the covenantee's anticipated losses caused
by losing clients to the covenantor-competitor. This creates an effec-
tive disincentive, without acting as a complete bar to competition. If
the relevant client population is so small that the covenantor must
compete directly with the covenantee, however, a calculation based on
loss from direct competition would prevent the covenantor from com-
peting entirely and thus have the same effect as injunctive relief. The
disadvantage of using anticipated loss for liquidated damages stems
from the difficulties of discovering the extent of direct competition to
calculate the damages.
C. Unreasonable Covenants: The Issue of Divisibility
Over the years, courts have developed three methods for dealing
with an unreasonable covenant not to compete. One of the earliest
methods was simply to refuse to enforce a covenant that was unrea-
sonable in any respect. 6 4 This approach could be explained in part by
judicial reluctance to rewrite the contract, a reluctance based on the
notions that such rewriting was inappropriate and that the parties' in-
tentions would be best carried out by not enforcing the covenant,
rather than by enforcing it in a form not contemplated by either
party.165 These notions, however, have gradually been replaced by the
judicial view that partial enforcement of a covenant actually comports
with the parties' expectations far better than invalidation.166 Thus, a
large majority of jurisdictions now permit partial enforcement of non-
competition covenants that are unreasonably broad. This partial en-
forcement comes in two forms: "blue-penciling" and judicial rewriting,
162. See, e.g., Gomez v. Chua Medical Corp. 510 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)($50,000
in liquidated damages upheld); Pollack v. Calimag, 458 N.W.2d 591 (Wis. Ct.
App.), review denied, 461 N.W.2d 444 (Wis. 1990)($25,000 liquidated damages
provision).
163. See, e.g., Dental East, P.C. v. Westercamp, 423 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988)(40
percent liquidated damage charge on fees collected from former clients); Dean
Van Horn Consulting Assocs. v. Wold, 395 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986)(staggered percentage tied to number of years covenantor no longer
employed).
164. Jeffrey G. Grody, Note, Partial Enforcement of Post-Employment Restrictive
Covenants, 15 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 181, 196 (1979). Some states provide for
this result legislatively; e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 1988)(requiring
courts either to enforce a covenant as written or to invalidate it).
165. Grody, supra note 164, at 199-200; see also Jeffrey S. Katz, Note, Judicial Modifi-
cation of Unreasonably Restrictive Covenants Not to Compete, 23 ARIZ. L. REv.
1353, 1357 (1981).
166. Grody, supra note 164, at 202-03.
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sometimes called the "reasonableness rule."167
1. The Blue-Pencil Rule
The so-called blue-pencil rule was developed to alleviate concern
about judicial authority to rewrite existing contracts.168 The term
"blue-pencil" derives from the editorial manner in which the rule is
applied.169 That is, the blue-pencil rule allows the court to strike out
unreasonable terms that are grammatically divisible, if the excision
will make the remaining terms reasonable.170 If an unreasonable cov-
enant is not grammatically divisible, however, the court must invali-
date the entire covenant.171
Many have criticized the "purely mechanical" approach of the
blue-pencil rule.172 The applicability of the rule rests solely on
whether the unenforceable portions can be excised grammatically
from the covenant without rewriting it altogether. Thus, for example,
if a covenant unreasonably prevented a veterinarian from practicing
in two adjoining cities, a court applying the blue pencil rule could
modify the covenant by striking out one of the cities and enforce it as
to the other city. In contrast, if the covenant unreasonably prevented
a veterinarian from practicing in an entire county (and was thus gram-
matically indivisible), the court would be forced to invalidate the en-
tire covenant. In either situation, modification is desirable to enable
the covenantee to retain at least some of the bargained-for protection,
and also to protect the covenantor from an overly restrictive bar. Be-
cause of the rule's inflexible requirement of divisibility, however,
167. Id. at 196-97.
168. Id. at 206.
169. 2 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.8, at 72-73 (1990)(a
court can create a reasonable covenant "merely by excising some of the words, as
it might do by editing the language with a blue pencil").
170. Id.; 6A CORBIN, supra note 40, § 1390, at 67-69; see also Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268
N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971)(enforcing covenant bar from oral surgery, but not from
dentistry).
171. Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ohio 1975). On the adoption and
application of the blue-pencil rule in Arizona, see Catherine Bergin Yalung, Case
Note, Redefining the Blue Pencil Rule: Phoenix Orthopaedic Surgeons, Ltd. v.
Peairs, 23 ARIz. ST. L.J. 859 (1991). See also Olliver/Pilcher Ins., Inc. v. Daniels,
715 P.2d 1218 (Ariz. 1986) (adopting the blue-pencil rule for covenants not to com-
pete, if severability of agreement is evident from the contract itself, and holding
the contract at issue not severable); Phoenix Orthopaedic Surgeons, Ltd. v.
Peairs, 790 P.2d 752 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)(distinguishing Olliver/Pilcher and af-
firming lower court's judicial modification of covenant because of necessity of
medical services to public welfare).
172. See, e.g., Data Management, Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1988) (agreeing
with criticism of "blue-pencil" rule as "too mechanical"); Raimonde v. Van
Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ohio 1975)("blue-pencil" rule has not worked well in
practice); see also 6A CORBIN, supra note 40, § 1390, at 67 (referring to the rule as
mechanical); Katz, supra note 165, at 1357-58; Grody, supra note 164, at 210.
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blue-pencil courts can give effect (albeit partial) only to the grammati-
cally divisible covenant. 73
Moreover, determining whether a covenant is divisible is not al-
ways an easy matter. In Lassen v. Benton,174 a veterinarian had signed
an employment contract containing a covenant not to compete. The
covenant prevented him from practicing "Veterinary Medicine or es-
tablish[ing], or work[ing] in any small animal hospital" within 12 miles
of the city limits of Mesa, Arizona.175 The Arizona Supreme Court
held that the time and territorial restrictions were reasonable.176 The
defendant subsequently moved for a rehearing to modify the covenant
by striking the term "Veterinary Medicine," which would enable him
to practice large-animal veterinary medicine in the proscribed area.177
He argued that the term "Veterinary Medicine" was too broad and
should be stricken from the covenant as divisible. Striking this term,
he asserted, would restrict him only in the practice of small-animal
medicine, thus leaving him free to practice large-animal medicine. 7 8
In Lassen II, the court stated:
we do not see how [enabling the veterinarian to practice large-animal veteri-
nary medicine] can be done without the Court rewriting the contract for the
parties, incorporating therein its notions as to what should be included. We
hold this cannot properly be done as the provisions of the contract are control-
ling and by its terms it is not divisible.1 7 9
The court refused to blue pencil a covenant divisible (at least argua-
bly) on its face. This refusal may reflect the court's concern that
merely striking the term "Veterinary Medicine," without providing
some additional qualifying language, would create confusion about the
activity restrained. In 1959, when Lassen was decided, the clearly-de-
fined practice paradigms of today's veterinary medicine had not been
established. The current trend toward practices devoted to small-
animal or food-animal medicine might make a court more willing to
blue pencil a covenant like that in Lassen, with confidence that the
parties' rights and responsibilities would be clear.
Nonetheless, Lassen exemplifies the problems inherent in the
blue-pencil approach. As a result, more and more courts have turned
from blue penciling to a more workable method that offers judicial
flexibility to fashion the proper relief in each case.'8 0
173. Grody, supra note 164, at 210 ("That the construction of a covenant should turn
on whether the parties chose the one or the other form of expression is, to say the
least, a difficult proposition to defend.").
174. Lassen v. Benton, 346 P.2d 137 (Ariz. 1959)(Lassen 1).
175. Id. at 138.
176. Id. at 139.
177. Lassen v. Benton, 347 P.2d 1012, 1013 (Ariz. 1959)(Lassen I).
178. Id. at 1013.
179. Id.
180. Grody, supra note 164, at 210 ("the blue-pencil rule stands as a curious anomaly, a
form of mechanical jurisprudence which deserves no place in a rational system of
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2. Rewriting the Covenant
In many recent decisions, the courts have rewritten overly broad
covenants so that their terms are reasonable and thus enforceable.181
Some commentators term this approach the "reasonableness test." 8 2
This approach is consistent with the courts' broad power in equity to
fashion appropriate relief. 8 3 The parties' intentions are not defeated,
it is reasoned, because of the presumption that they have already as-
sented to a restraint less severe than the (unreasonable) one imposed
in the covenant. 8 4
The rule of reasonableness is subject to criticism, however. Most
significant is its potential to encourage oppressively drafted covenants.
Covenantees (particularly employers) may draft, and hope to enforce,
unreasonably broad covenants with the expectation that, if the cove-
nant is challenged, the court will simply modify the covenant to make
it reasonable, rather than strike it completelyl85 Some assert that the
rule of reasonableness will tend to restrict a covenantor's mobility.
That is, covenantors who would prefer to compete contrary to the cov-
enant will be reluctant to challenge the validity of the covenant when
the covenant is likely to be rewritten rather than rejected. Moreover,
the existence of a broad covenant, likely to be only modified by a re-
viewing court, may discourage other employers in the area from hiring
the covenantor, for fear of legal challenges or less cordial relations
with the competitor-covenantee.' 8 6
justice"). See also Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa
1971) (overruling prior case law and permitting the court to rewrite overly broad
covenants to provide reasonable terms); Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544,
546-47 (Ohio 1975)(rejecting blue-pencil approach in favor of a more flexible ap-
proach); accord Central Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn.
1984); Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 552 A.2d 1311 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989),
modified, 572 A.2d 510 (Md. 1990).
181. See, e.g., Kershaw v. Knox Kershaw, Inc., 523 So. 2d 351 (Ala. 1988); Data Man-
agement, Inc. v. Green, 757 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1988); Insurance Ctr. v. Taylor, 499
P.2d 1252 (Idaho 1972); Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa
1971); Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 552 A.2d 1311 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989),
modified, 572 A.2d 510 (Md. 1990); Solari Indus. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53 (N.J.
1970); Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio 1975); Central Adjustment
Bureau v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984); see also Reddy v. Community
Health Found., 298 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1982); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 169, § 5.8,
at 73; 6A CORBIN, supra note 40, § 1390, at 70-71.
182. E.g., Grody, supra note 164, at 197.
183. Id. at 212.
184. Solari Indus. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 59 (N.J. 1970). See also Grody, supra note
. 164, at 213.
185. Reddy v. Community Health Found., 298 S.E.2d 906, 914-15 (W. Va. 1982); 2
FARNswoRTi, supra note 169, § 5.8, at 74.
186. See Blake, supra note 28, at 682-83. Professor Blake refers here to criticisms of
"severance," but his discussion, id. at 681-82, seems to include both excision of
divisible parts of restraints and rewriting a covenant to make it reasonable.
A further criticism of the rule of reasonableness is that, even in the absence of
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Nonetheless, not all employment contracts are adhesion contracts;
many covenants are drafted too broadly because of the difficulties in
tailoring narrow, individualized provisions. 8 7 For covenantees, too,
overly broad covenants pose disadvantages. One major disadvantage is
the cost of litigation. Though litigation may be a greater burden to the
covenantor/employee, it still imposes significant costs on the
covenantee.
Recognizing the risk that some employers will take advantage of
the rule of reasonableness, some courts have conditioned modification
on a showing that the covenant reflects good-faith bargaining on the
part of both parties.18s At least one commentator has suggested, how-
ever, that a requirement of good faith alone is insufficient.189 Though
a good-faith requirement may prevent malicious drafting, it does not
encourage drafters to write covenants that are appropriately narrow.
That is, without some legal incentive, drafters may attempt only to
satisfy the good faith requirement, but not to draft covenants limited
to the scope of protectable interests. 90 To encourage more narrow
covenants, courts should reject vague, broad covenants and require a
showing that the covenant bears a reasonable relationship to that em-
ployer's legitimate protectable interest.191 Alternatively, the court
could rewrite a covenant so that the judicially rewritten covenant ex-
ceeds the minimum standards of reasonableness (that is, gives the cov-
enantee less protection than would be reasonable in the absence of the
original, overbroad covenant). 92 This approach may be a further in-
centive to drafters, provided the probability that an employee will
malicious drafting by employers, judicial modification provides no deterrence for
sloppy draftsmanship. Grody, supra note 164, at 192; Katz, supra note 165, at
1358.
187. Blake, supra note 28, at 683. Professor Blake contends that some employers must
draft broad covenants because of the difficulty of anticipating the extent of an
employee's exposure to protectable interests.
188. E.g., Data Management, Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1988)(courts can cure
the concern for overreaching by imposing a good-faith requirement on covenan-
tees); see also 2 FARNswoRTH, supra note 169, § 5.8, at 74. But cf Raimonde v.
Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544,547 (Ohio 1975)(presumption that "[m]ost employers
who enter contracts do so in good faith, and seek only to protect legitimate inter-
ests. In fact, relatively few employment contracts reach the courts.").
189. Grody, supra note 164, at 222.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 225. This approach has been used in two cases: Insurance Ctr. v. Taylor, 499
P.2d 1252 (Idaho 1972), and Reddy v. Community Health Found., 298 S.E.2d 906
(W. Va. 1982). In each case, the court looked to the inherent reasonableness of
the terms initially before considering whether modification was appropriate. One
of the relevant factors was whether the covenant, as written, protected only the
covenantee's legitimate interest. Reddy v. Community Health Found., 298 S.E.2d
906, 915-16 (W. Va. 1982). If not, then the whole covenant fails. Id. at 915.
192. 6A CoRBIN, supra note 40, § 1390, at 77.
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challenge the covenant is high.193
Occasionally the parties to a covenant may fail to define a term,
such as time or geographical area, of the covenant not to compete. In
this situation, it would seem appropriate for a court to supply the miss-
ing term. But the extent of the restriction should be the smallest geo-
graphic area or the shortest time period that will protect the
employer/covenantee's legitimate interest.
The above-described approach works best for quantifiable re-
straints such as area or time. It is not so simple to apply to restraints
that are more qualitative in nature-for example, restraints on the
covenantor's scope of activity. Nonetheless, similar principles should
apply. In rewriting an unreasonable covenant, a court could restrict
the covenant's coverage to the narrowest form of activity that would
provide reasonable protection to the covenantee.
Despite criticisms of the rule of reasonableness, a majority of juris-
dictions have adopted reasonable modification instead of the blue pen-
cil approach or the refusal to enforce a defective covenant. 194 In fact,
a number of states have adopted the rule of reasonableness by
statute.195
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE COMMON-LAW APPROACH
Though most covenants not to compete are evaluated by the pre-
vailing common law standard, a growing number of states have
adopted legislation that alters the common law to some extent. Many
state statutes have practical implications for the veterinarian who is
drafting or negotiating a contract. In addition, covenants may be sub-
ject to scrutiny under federal antitrust law.
A. State Legislation
All states have some form of antitrust legislation.19 6 In a number
of states, antitrust laws broadly condemn contracts in restraint of
trade, but do not address specifically the issue of covenants not to com-
193. Using another approach, the court could modify the covenant to the same extent
that the original covenant was unreasonable. For example, if a court were to
determine that a covenant restricting a veterinarian from practicing veterinary
medicine in a radius of ten miles for five years was unreasonable, but that a rea-
sonable covenant would limit the covenantor to eight miles and three years, the
court might rewrite the covenant so that it restricts the covenantor for six miles
and for one year. This would impose a penalty for the unreasonably burdensome
covenant.
194. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 181.
195. See GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1 (Michie 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a
(West 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 218-219 (1990); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
§ 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
196. See WILLIAm J. HAYNEs, STATE ANTITRUST LAWs 232 app. (1989)(listing substan-
tive offenses under state antitrust statutes and relevant statutory sections).
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pete.197 Courts in these jurisdictions therefore analyze non-competi-
tion covenants under the common-law standards the states have
adopted.198 Legislation in a significant minority of states, however, di-
rectly addresses the covenant not to compete. The state statutes vary
significantly both in terms of the parties subject to regulation and the
form of regulation. Analysis of the legislation itself and interpretive
case law determine whether and to what extent veterinary covenants
are governed by this legislation. The following discussion identifies
some of the states that regulate covenants not to compete by statute,
discusses the various state models of legislation, and highlights the im-
plications of the statutes for veterinary covenants. This discussion is
intended to focus briefly on the effect of these statutes for veterinari-
ans, rather than to provide an exhaustive analysis of the legislation. 99
Although the state statutes vary significantly, four general ap-
proaches can be identified: codification of the common law, prohibi-
tion of covenants restraining the exercise of a profession, prohibition
of covenants in physician contracts, and regulation solely of employee
covenants.
1. Codification of the Common Law
Statutes in four states (Georgia, Hawaii, North Carolina, and
Texas 200 ) more or less adopt the common-law approach to non-compe-
tition covenants. The language of the statutes in Georgia, Hawaii, and
Texas expressly restates that state's respective version of the com-
mon-law rule.201 In Hawaii, for example, contracts in restraint of
197. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 45.50.562 (1986); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1402 (1987);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-26 (1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340 (McKinney 1988).
198. See, e.g., Robert S. Weiss & Assoc. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216 (Conn. 1988).
199. Recent legislative changes may be relevant. Compare, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 542.33(2)(a)(West 1988) with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33(2)(a)(West Supp.
1992)(amendment requires courts not to enter injunctions that are "contrary to
the public health, safety, or welfare," but presumably permits injunctions where
covenant is aimed at preventing the "use of specific trade secrets, customers lists,
or direct solicitation of existing customers"). Compare also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:921 (West 1985) with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West Supp.
1992) (changes from an employee-only focus to a broader focus including the sale
of good will and partnership dissolution). Legislative changes may affect the ap-
plication of a specific covenant. See, e.g., Compton v. Joseph Lepak, 397 N.W.2d
311 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (prior statute that invalidated non-competition covenant
controlled because it applied at execution of the covenant, despite current statute
that would validate the same covenant).
200. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1 (Michie 1992); HAw. REV. STAT. § 480-4 (1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 75-2,75-5 (1988); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West Supp.
1991).
201. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1 (Michie 1992)(allowing reasonable non-competition cov-
enants as partial restraints of trade and supplying examples of restraints in em-
ployment, partnership and sale-of-business contracts that are deemed
reasonable). See HAw. REv. STAT. § 480-4(c)(1)-(3)(1989)(exempts reasonable
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trade are generally illegal. Nonetheless, covenants in the transfer of a
business or partnership are permitted, if they operate within a reason-
able area and for a reasonable period of time. Covenants by an em-
ployee not to use trade secrets in unfair competition are permitted
when reasonably necessary to protect the employer, without imposing
undue hardship on the employee. 202 In North Carolina, restraints in
violation of the common law are unlawful.203 The statute, however,
explicitly permits covenants made in conjunction with the sale of a
business and its goodwill, if the covenant does not violate common-law
principles.204
It appears that these state statutes offer little or no protection to
the covenantor beyond that already available at common law. In at
least one state, Texas, the statute specifically authorizes reformation
of covenants that, at common law, would have been void and un-
enforceable.205 Thus, it may actually reduce protection to the
covenantor.
2. Restraints on Practicing a Profession
A number of state statutes refine the common law somewhat by
declaring some types of covenants void per se, while retaining com-
mon-law analysis for other types. Each state statute of this type be-
gins with language to the effect that: "Every contract by which anyone
is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of
any kind otherwise than is provided . . . is to that extent void."206
covenants in the contexts of the sale of a business, leases, partnerships, and em-
ployment contracts from a general prohibition of contracts in restraint of trade);
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West Supp. 1991)("a covenant not to com-
pete is enforceable to the extent it: (1) is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable
agreement.. .; and (2) contains reasonable limitations as to time, geographical
area, and scope of activity to be restrained. .
202. HAw. REV. STAT. § 480-4(c)(4)(1989).
203. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-2 (1988)(prohibits all restrictive covenants void at com-
mon law). See also Robins & Weill, Inc. v. Mason, 320 S.E.2d 693, 696 (N.C. App.),
appeal denied, 322 S.E.2d 558 (N.C. 1984)(non-competition agreements between
employers and employees that restrain trade are valid and enforceable if they are
in writing, made a part of the employment contract, based on valuable considera-
tion, designed to protect an employer's legitimate interest, and reasonable with
respect to both time and territory).
204. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(d)(1988).
205. Compare TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c)(West Supp. 1991)(permits a
court to reform a covenant to the extent necessary to comply with § 15.50(2) con-
cerning reasonable limits as to time, area, and activity restrained) with Cukjati v.
Burkett, 772 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)(declaring non-competition covenant
that exceeded reasonable limits void and unenforceable). See also DeSantis v.
Wackenhurst Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990)(suggesting Cukiati has been
superceded by statute).
206. E.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 53-9-8 (1990). See also
CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ch. 542.33 (1991); LA.
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From this general prohibition, the statutes list exceptions for certain
types of non-competition covenants. Four states, Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, and South Dakota, permit covenants not to compete in the
sale of a business, an employment contract, or a partnership dissolu-
tion provided the covenants are limited in the area or nature of the
activity restrained. 07 Florida, for example, permits restraints "within
a reasonably limited time and area," when the covanantee is compet-
ing in that area.208
The remaining five states-California, Montana, Nevada, North
Dakota, and Oklahoma-permit covenants only for the sale of a busi-
ness or the dissolution of a partnership.2 09 This limitation indicates
that non-competition covenants associated with contracts for employ-
ment are void under the general prohibition of restrictive covenants.
Some California courts, however, have made exceptions to this princi-
ple in the case of confidential information.21 0
The specific language in each statute affects its application to
health professionals, including to veterinarians. The statutes gener-
ally prohibit contracts by which anyone "is restrained from exercising
a lawful profession.... "211 Except for South Dakota, the provisions
do not mention the term "profession" in sections that list exceptions
to the basic rule.212 At least one state, Alabama, has held this distinc-
REv. STAT. ANN. § 23.921 (West Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (1989);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06(1)-(2)(1975); S.D. CODumD LAws ANN. §§ 53-9-9 to -11
(1990). For a variant, see NEv. REV. STAT. § 598A.040 (1989).
207. ALA. CODE § 8-1-1(b)-(c)(1984)(excepts covenants that restrain parties "from
soliciting old customers ... within a specified county, city, or part thereof so long
as the [buyer, partner, or employer] carries on a like business therein."); FLA.
STAT. ch. 542.33(2)-(3)(1991)(allows restraints that are "within a reasonably lim-
ited time and area" so long as buyer, partner, or employer "carries on a like busi-
ness therein"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(b)-(c)(West Supp. 1990)(similar to
Alabama); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 53-9-9 to -11 (1990)(similar to Alabama).
208. FLA. STAT. ch. 542.33 (1991).
209. CALiF. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-16602 (West 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-
704 to -705 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.040 (1989); N. D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-
06(1)-(2)(1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 218-219 (1991). Nevada's statute differs
from the other four. It permits restrictive covenants "which are part of a contract
of sale for a business and which bar the seller of a business from competing with
the purchaser of the business sold within a reasonable market area for a reason-
able period of time .... NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.040(5)(a)(1989). The statute
addresses only the sale of a business. Moreover, the list of prohibited acts does
not seem to include covenants for employment contracts or partnership agree-
ments, and their status remains unclear under the statute.
210. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)(section proscrib-
ing restraints of trade does not obviate the duty not to disclose confidential em-
ployer information). Cf. Bosley Medical Group v. Adamson, 207 Cal. Rptr. 477
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(a physician-employee's sale of stock interest in hospital held
to be a sham in order to get around prohibition of statute).
211. See statutes cited, supra note 206.
212. For example, ALA. CODE § 8-1-1(b)(1984) states:
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tion to be meaningful and intentional on the part of the legislature. In
Odess v. Taylor,21 3 a physician attempted to enforce a non-competition
covenant against a former associate who had left to join a nearby
clinic. Citing the shortage of physicians in Alabama, the Alabama
Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's finding that to give ef-
fect to the covenant "would be adverse to the public interest."2 1 4 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the failure to include the term
"profession" in the section permitting non-competition covenants in
employment contracts2 1 5 prevented the plaintiff from using this sec-
tion to validate the covenant.2 1 6 Instead, the court applied the more
restrictive section that prohibits contracts restraining one's exercise of
a profession.2 1 7 Thus, under the court's interpretation of the Alabama
statute, physicians may not enforce covenants not to compete against
other physicians.
In 1991, the Alabama Supreme Court extended this interpretation
to a veterinary covenant. In Friddle v. Raymond,218 the plaintiff vet-
erinarian sought to enforce a covenant imposed pursuant to the sale of
the defendant veterinarian's practice. The covenant restricted the de-
fendant from practicing within six miles of the plaintiff's practice for
a period of three years.21 9 The court referred to its analysis of the
term "profession" in Odess, as well as to the learned nature of veteri-
nary science, to conclude that the practice of veterinary medicine is a
profession. As professionals, veterinarians are not excluded from the
general rule prohibiting covenants not to compete; therefore the Ala-
One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer and
one who is employed as an agent, servant or employee may agree with
his employer to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar busi-
ness and from soliciting old customers of such employer.. so long as the
buyer... or employer carries on a like business therein.
But see S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 53-9-9 to -11 (1990)(allowing an employee to
agree not to compete "directly or indirectly in the same business or profession"
(emphasis added); the sections on sale of goodwill and dissolution of a partnership
do not include the term "profession").
213. 211 So. 2d 805 (Ala. 1968).
214. Id. at 808.
215. ALA. CODE § 8-1-1(b)(1984), quoted supra note 212.
216. Odess v. Taylor, 211 So. 2d 805, 811 (Ala. 1968). Specifically, the court stated:
Having included 'profession' in Section 22 [the predecessor to Section 8-
1-1 providing a general prohibition against restraints of trade], and omit-
ted this term in Section 23 [the predecessor to Section 8-1-1(b) providing
an exception for the sale of a business or an employment contract], an
affirmative inference is created that the legislature did not intend to in-
clude professions in Section 23.
Id.
217. ALA. CODE § 8-1-1(a)(1984).
218. 575 So. 2d 1038 (Ala. 1991).
219. Id. The covenant also contained a liquidated damages clause that required the
defendant to forfeit receipt of any remaining payments for the sale as of the time
he breached the covenant. Id. at 1039.
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bama Supreme Court held that the covenant could not be enforced.
The court stated, "Although the remaining subsections... provide for
exceptions to the general rule [prohibiting contracts in restraint of
trade], including an exception for the sale of good will of a business,
this Court has stated on numerous occasions that a 'professional' can-
not fall within these statutory exceptions." 220
Decisions in states with statutes similar to Alabama's either have
not addressed the issue of whether the variation in the language is
significant or have not considered or adopted the Alabama court's in-
terpretation.22' In South Dakota, the legislature has addressed the is-
sue, apparently to permit covenants not to compete between
professionals by inserting the term "profession" into the section pro-
viding an exception for employment contracts. 222 The analogous sec-
tions pertaining to the sale of good will and the dissolution of a
partnership refer only to a business and do not mention professions.223
Resolution of the issue of whether to construe the statutory lan-
guage narrowly, as the Alabama Supreme Court has done, turns pri-
marily on policy grounds. The Alabama court's restrictive
interpretation disfavors restraints "because they tend not only to de-
prive the public of efficient service but also tend to impoverish the
individual.224 This rationale is particularly compelling in the context
of medical professions, because the public has an interest in the availa-
bility of efficient health care services. Thus, it is probably appropriate
to interpret statutes narrowly when that interpretation will promote
the availability of health care. Arguably, however, as the South Da-
kota legislature apparently realized, in the context of a sale of a busi-
ness or dissolution of a partnership, the analysis may be somewhat
different. The public policy interest in efficient service still exists, but
protecting the transferee's investment in goodwill is also important. If
the law does not permit purchasers or remaining partners to invest in
goodwill and thereafter to protect it through covenants not to com-
pete, incentives to invest in professional practices will decrease.225
On a somewhat related point, the Florida legislature has recently
addressed the policy interest in the public's well-being by adopting an
amendment to the statute governing covenants not to compete. The
220. Id. at 1040.
221. See, e.g., South Bay Radiology Medical Assocs. v. Asher, 269 Cal. Rptr. 15 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990)(applying exception for partnership dissolutions in CAL. Bus & PROF.
CODE § 16602 (West 1987) to partnership agreement among radiologists contain-
ing a non-competition clause).
222. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 53-9-11 (1990).
223. S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. §§ 53-9-9, 53-9-10 (1990).
224. Robinson v. Computer Servicenters, Inc., 346 So. 2d 940, 943 (Ala. 1977).
225. E.g., 'Plaintiff made it plain that he was not interested in acquiring the hospital
and the facilities without having a binding covenant from the defendant ... 
Griffin v. Hunt, 268 P.2d 874, 876 (Okla. 1954).
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amended section permits reasonable covenants not to compete to be
enforced by injunction. The amendment, however, adds that "the
court shall not enter an injunction contrary to the public health,
safety or welfare ... ,"226 The work of veterinarians, at least in some
situations,227 affects the public directly. Thus, in Florida, certain vet-
erinary covenants not to compete may be among those covenants that
cannot be enforced without harm to public health, safety, and welfare.
3. Covenants among Physicians
Covenants not to compete involving medical professionals have re-
ceived special treatment in some jurisdictions. For example, Colorado,
Delaware, and Massachusetts expressly prohibit covenants not to com-
pete in contracts among physicians. 228 No reported decision in these
states has expanded coverage of the statute to include veterinarians.
Such expansion appears unlikely, at least in Colorado and Massachu-
setts. In Colorado, the statute defines the "practice of medicine" nar-
rowly by reference to statutory provisions regulating the practice of
human medicine.2 29 In Massachusetts, the covenant prohibition ap-
pears in the statutory chapter that governs registration and regula-
tion of physicians and surgeons.23 0 Neither state law specifically
addresses veterinary medicine in those sections. 231
226. FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a)(1991). The injunction may not enforce an unreasonable
covenant or be used where there is no showing of irreparable injury; irreparable
injury is presumed in certain situations.
227. For example, decreased veterinary service to livestock facilities or dairy parlors
affects the public health, safety, and welfare when it increases the risk of food-
borne illness or disease otherwise communicable to humans.
228. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(3)(West 1990)(voids all contract provisions re-
straining a physician's right to practice medicine but permits liquidated damages,
of which damages from competition may be a part); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707
(1989)(same as Colorado); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 112, § 12x (Law. Co-op. 1991)(in-
validates the offending portion of "[a]ny contract or agreement ... which includes
any restriction of the right of [a] physician to practice medicine in any geographic
area for any period of time...").
229. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(3)(West 1990), referring to the right to practice
medicine, as defined in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-106. See Michael J. Katz,
Drafting a Noncompetition Clause for the Colorado Contract, 20 COLO. LAw. 703
(1991).
In addition, the Colorado statute has a more general section that permits a
covenant not to compete in "[a] contract for the purchase and sale of a business
. .." and for "executive and management personnel and officers and employees
who constitute professional staff to executive and management personnel ......
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(West 1990)(emphasis added). It is unclear
whether veterinarians fit within these exceptions and therefore could be allowed
to use restrictive covenants, subject to common-law rules.
230. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12x (Law. Co-op. 1991).
231. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(3), referring to § 12-36-106 (West 1990); MASS.
ANN. LAWs ch. 112, § 12x (Law. Co-op. 1991).
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4. Employee Covenant Legislation
Some jurisdictions-Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin 232-- address
the validity of non-competition agreements in employment contracts,
but not in partnership dissolution agreements or the sale of a business.
The latter involve parties with more equal bargaining positions and
thus may require less legislative guidance than employment contracts.
Statutory restrictions on employment covenants are generally no
more restrictive than the common law.
The Oregon statute authorizes a non-competition covenant be-
tween employer and employee if the covenant is part of an initial em-
ployment contract or a subsequent good faith advancement of the
employee.23 3 This statutory authorization "applies only to non-compe-
tition agreements made in the context of an employment relationship
or contract and not otherwise."234 Presumably, the common law gov-
erns in other situations.23 5
The Michigan and Wisconsin statutes permit covenants not to com-
pete in employment contracts if restrictions on time, geographic area,
and type of employment are reasonable.236 The statutes differ in ap-
proach, however, when a covenant is unreasonable. Michigan permits
the court to limit an overbroad covenant to "render it reasonable in
light of the circumstances in which it was made and specifically en-
force the agreement as limited."2 37 Wisconsin, on the other hand,
states that an unreasonable covenant is illegal and void; it cannot be
enforced "even as to so much of the covenant or performance as would
be a reasonable restraint."238 This approach is inconsistent with the
modern trend of enforcing overbroad contracts to the extent they are
232. MIcH. Cozip. LAws ANN. § 445.774a (West 1989); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 65.295
(1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 1988).
233. OR. REv. STAT. § 653.295(1)(1989). See Pacific Veterinary Hosp. v. White, 696
P.2d 570 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)(applying an earlier version of the statute to hold
unenforceable a covenant entered subsequent to initial employment).
234. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(2)(1989).
235. For Oregon approaches to covenants, see, e.g., North Pac. Lumber Co. v. Oliver,
596 P.2d 931, 938 (Or. 1979)("courts will uphold [contracts in restraint of trade]
where they are reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate interest of the person
in whose favor they run, do not impose an unreasonable hardship upon the per-
son against whom they are asserted, and are not injurious to the public inter-
est."); McCallum v. Asbury, 393 P.2d 774 (Or. 1964)(enforcing 10-year, 30-mile
covenant contained in medical partnership agreement); Ladd v. Hikes, 639 P.2d
1307 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)(relying on McCallum to enforce similar covenant in em-
ployment contract with the same medical clinic).
236. MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.774a (West 1989)(if the "covenant is reasonable as
to its duration, geographical area, and the type of employment... "); WIS. STAT.
§ 103.465 (1990)("if the restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for the pro-
tection of the employer...").
237. MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.774a (West 1989).
238. Wis. STAT. § 103.465 (1990).
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reasonable. 239
The Wisconsin statute raises the more general issue of how states
with legislation addressing covenants not to compete deal with unrea-
sonable covenants. With the exception of Wisconsin, states that have
addressed the issue allow enforcement of the covenant to the extent it
is considered reasonable. Some states have resolved the issue by stat-
ute;240 in others, courts have interpreted the statute to permit this
result.241
B. Federal Antitrust Laws
In addition to, or instead of, relying on state law to challenge a
covenant not to compete, veterinarian covenantors may consider ap-
plicability of the federal antitrust laws-primarily Section One of the
Sherman Act.242 The successful plaintiff in a federal antitrust action
may be entitled to treble damages and attorneys' fees. 243 It must be
acknowledged at the outset, however, that federal courts have been
reluctant so far to grant damage awards to this type of antitrust
plaintiff.2 44
In separate lines of cases, the federal courts have acknowledged
the Sherman Act's application both to the learned professions, such as
veterinary medicine, and to covenants not to compete.245 Questions
remain, however, as to the extent of the Sherman Act's applicability
to various types of veterinary covenants. Therefore, the purpose of
the following discussion is to identify those questions and suggest pos-
sible answers. The discussion concludes that the prospects of relief
under federal antitrust law are remote, but should not be discounted
completely.
Two primary barriers face veterinary antitrust plaintiffs: the juris-
dictional requirement that the anticompetitive activity be in or sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce and the required proof that the
covenant not to compete be unreasonable.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 181-184.
240. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2 (Michie 1992); MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 445.774a (West
1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 218-219 (1990); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE § 15.51 (West
Supp. 1991).
241. See, e.g., Silver v. Dis-Com Sec., Inc., 403 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Hawkins Chemical, Inc. v. McNea, 321 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1982); Loescher v. Po-
licky, 173 N.W.2d 50 (S.D. 1969)(veterinary covenant that exceeded two-year stat-
utory limit could be enforced for up to two years, as permitted by the statute).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The authors express appreciation to Professor Stephen F.
Ross for his review of an earlier draft of this section of the article.
243. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)(1988). But on the problems connected with treble damages, see
Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild" Antitrust Treatment of
Postemployment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621, 655-66.
244. See infra note 301 and accompanying text.
245. See infra notes 249-253, 276-302 and accompanying text.
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1. Jurisdictional Requirements
The jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act pose a signifi-
cant threshold for the antitrust plaintiff. For Sherman Act purposes,
the plaintiff must establish, among other things,24 6 that the defend-
ant's alleged antitrust activity occurs in "trade or commerce among
the several States." 24 7 As the courts have interpreted this require-
ment, two separate elements are relevant: whether the activity consti-
246. Another Sherman Act requirement is that at least two persons act in concert. See
Mayo, supra note 6, at 313. This requirement should be met easily in most in-
stances because a non-competition covenant is an agreement between two poten-
tial competitors. Id. at 314.
247. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The circuits disagree as to whether the defendant's anticom-
petitive activity itself, or only the defendant's general business activity, must be
in or affect interstate commerce. See Mayo, supra note 6, at 316 n.56. In particu-
lar, there is disagreement about whether the Supreme Court's decision in McLain
v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980), overruled precedent that required the de-
fendant's alleged illegal activity to affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., Hospital
Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 744 (1976)(citing several alleged
effects on interstate commerce as a result of defendant hospital's efforts to pre-
vent expansion of local competing hospital). See also Crane v. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715, 721-24 (10th Cir. 1981)(en banc)(discussing the
line of precedent prior to McLain that required the alleged antitrust activity to
affect interstate commerce); Mayo, supra note 6, at 316 n.56. In McLain, the
Supreme Court stated,
To establish the jurisdictional element of the Sherman Act violation it
would be sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate a substantial effect on
interstate commerce generated by respondents' brokerage activity. Peti-
tioners need not make the more particularized showing of an effect on
interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to fix commission
rates, or by those other aspects of respondents' activity that are alleged
to be unlawful.
444 U.S. 232, 242-43 (1980).
A majority of circuits that have addressed the issue have held that McLain
fails to overturn precedent requiring the alleged illegal activity itself to have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Stone v. William Beaumont Hosp.,
782 F.2d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 1986)(agreed with Second Circuit's reading of McLain
(in Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922 (2nd Cir. 1983)) that an-
ticompetitive conduct, if local in nature, must be shown to "'infect' those general
business activities of the defendant which do, or are likely to, effect [sic] inter-
state commerce"); Seglin v. Esau, 769 F.2d 1274, 1280 (7th Cir. 1985)(court is to
consider only those activities that tie defendant's illegal activity to interstate com-
merce); Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338, 1343 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984)(defendant's alleg-
edly illegal conduct must affect interstate commerce); Furlong v. Long Island
College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1983); Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 649 F.2d 36, 45 (Ist Cir. 1981); Crane v. Intermountain
Health Care, 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981)(en banc).
Two circuits, however, have held that McLain changed the focus from the
defendant's illegal activity to the defendant's general business activity. See
Shahawy v. Harrison, 778 F.2d 636, 640 (11th Cir. 1985)(defendant's general busi-
ness activities are the proper focus); Western Waste Serv. v. Universal Waste
Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir.), cer denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980)(McLain
does not require proof that defendant's alleged activity affects interstate com-
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tutes trade or commerce, and whether that trade or commerce is
"among the several States."Ms
The first element, whether veterinary medicine constitutes trade
or commerce, has been largely resolved by Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar.249 In Goldfarb, the United States Supreme Court held that the
practice of law constitutes a trade for purposes of Sherman Act regula-
tion,250 thus refining the somewhat equivocal attitude to the learned
professions reflected in prior cases.2 5 ' Goldfarb has since been applied
to the medical profession.252 Thus, the practice of veterinary
medicine, at least when it involves economic principles and not ethical
ones, is apparently also subject to federal antitrust regulation.2 5 3
merce). See also United States v. H & M, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 651, 657 (M.D. Pa.
1983)(aligning with Ninth Circuit).
The debate over this issue should have little impact on covenant cases. In a
covenant not to compete, the anticompetitive activity is preventing someone from
practicing veterinary medicine in a given area. Thus, if practicing veterinary
medicine can be said to affect interstate commerce substantially, see infra text
accompanying notes 256-275, it follows that the act of preventing it would also
substantially affect interstate commerce. Hence, it matters little which test even-
tually wins approval.
248. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). See also Mayo, supra note 6, at 313.
249. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
250. Id. at 787-88.
251. Though dictum in Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), sug-
gested that the medical profession might be distinguishable from a trade, id. at
653, the Supreme Court declined to decide the issue despite several opportunities
in subsequent cases. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326,
338-39 (1952)(Supreme Court accepted district court's finding that medical serv-
ices provided by defendant physicians' group did constitute interstate commerce
without discussing the district court's other finding that "the sale of medical serv-
ices... [was] not trade or commerce within the meaning of Section 1"); American
Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1943)(declined to hold
whether practice of medicine was trade where focus was on plaintiff's activities; a
nonprofit organization designed to sell and provide medical services, of which
doctors were employees, was clearly trade). See also Friends of Animals, Inc. v.
American Veterinary Medical Ass'n, 310 F. Supp. 1016, 1017 (D.S.D. 1970)(unnec-
essary to decide issue of whether veterinary medical association was engaged in
trade where focus was on plaintiffs who were "engaged in reducing the number of
homeless and unwanted cats and dogs" and merely employed veterinarians to aid
in accomplishing this objective). For further discussion, see Mayo, supra note 6,
at 314 & nn.40-41.
252. See e.g. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982)(re-
jecting defendant's argument that the lack of experience in medical care industry
justifies not applying Sherman Act's per se rule to alleged price-fixing agree-
ment); Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1980)("with regard
to its economic aspects professional activity is subject to the policies of the anti-
trust laws"). See also National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978).
253. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975); Williams v. St.
Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Mayo, supra note 6, at 314-
15.
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The second element, whether the alleged trade or commerce is
"among the several States," presents a bigger hurdle for veterinarians
seeking federal antitrust jurisdiction. The practice of human medicine
("per se and without more") is generally considered a local activity.25 4
By analogy, veterinary medicine might also be a local activity, though
no federal case law seems to establish this principle.255 But federal
regulatory authority can sometimes extend to activities that are essen-
tially local in nature. The Supreme Court has held that the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution applies to activities
that have a "close and substantial relationship to interstate com-
merce."256 Similarly, the Supreme Court has noted that even local
business restraints can violate the Sherman Act.257 The required link
with interstate commerce for Sherman Act purposes exists when a re-
straint based on local activity "substantially and adversely affects in-
terstate commerce." 258
Despite the requirement that a regulated activity substantially af-
fect interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has interpreted the re-
quired interstate nexus rather liberally, both under the Commerce
Clause and for the Sherman Act.259 Even a liberal approach to the
interstate nexus, however, does not encompass every commercial ac-
tivity. In fact, the medical professions have posed special difficulties
because of the predominantly local nature of their activities.26 0 Thus
courts have identified several factors that help to establish the appro-
priate nexus between the anticompetitive activity and interstate com-
merce: whether a plaintiff receives revenue from federally-funded
254. Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 454 (7th Cir. 1980).
255. An economic survey by the American Veterinary Medical Association in 1988 re-
vealed that the larger veterinary practices encompass an area with a mean radius
of 36 miles. Wise, supra note 103, at 252 (table 3).
256. JOHN E. NowAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTrruTIONAL
LAW § IV, at 165 (2d ed. 1983).
257. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738,743 n.2 (1975). See also
Mayo, supra note 6, at 316; Sullivan, supra note 243, at 625 n.22.
258. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1975)(quoting Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974)); see also Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948); Mayo, supra
note 6, at 316.
259. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 745 (1975)("An effect
can be 'substantial' under the Sherman Act even if its impact on interstate com-
merce falls far short of causing enterprises to fold or affecting market price.");
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942)("That appellee's own contribution
to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him
from the scope of federal regulation .... ).
260. See Huelsman v. Civic Ctr. Corp., 873 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1989); Furlong v. Long
Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Jonathan D. Gordon,
Antitrust in the Health Care Field-Subject Matter Jurisdiction, COLO. LAW.,
June 1989, at 1113; Mayo, supra note 6, at 317.
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programs or out-of-state insurers;261 whether the plaintiff receives
supplies from out of state;262 and, in some circuits, whether patients
travel from other states to receive treatment by the plaintiff.263 These
factors have been most relevant in cases where the parties are large-
scale medical care providers like hospitals. It is still unclear whether
these factors can support an interstate commerce nexus in a case in-
volving a small, private practice.264
A further nexus, not available to physicians, may be relevant for
some veterinary plaintiffs: the connection of the food-animal vet-
erinarian with production agriculture. It has long been established
that the shipment of livestock, as well as milk and other animal prod-
ucts, 265 across state lines constitutes interstate commerce. 266 More-
over, the Supreme Court has held that the United States Department
of Agriculture's authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause ap-
plies to agricultural activity that is essentially local in nature (that is,
intrastate) but has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, when
control over the intrastate transaction is necessary to make regulation
of interstate commerce effective. 2 6 7
Reduction of the spread of infectious disease has justified federal
regulation of interstate movement of livestock. In Thornton v. United
States,2 68 decided in 1925, the Supreme Court upheld congressional au-
thority to regulate the movement (even the ranging) of diseased live-
stock between states. The Court stated:
ITihe authority of Congress over interstate commerce extends to dealing with
and preventing burdens to that commerce and the spread of disease from one
state to another... would clearly be such a burden, if it were not to be re-
garded as commerce itself .... 269
It seems likely that, for purposes of federal antitrust law, veterinari-
ans who provide veterinary service to animal production facilities sub-
261. Mayo, supra note 6, at 317.
262. Id at 318.
263. Id at 318 & n.62. See also Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d
530, 540 (5th Cir. 1978)("Although the mere fact of dealings with out-of-state cus-
tomers, whether or not those customers cross state lines for the purpose of buy-
ing a firm's goods or services, might not of itself establish a sufficient interstate
nexus, it does not follow that those dealings are of no pertinence whatsoever.").
264. The American Veterinary Medical Association does not keep records on the aver-
age number of veterinarians in a given practice. Anecdotal evidence, however,
suggests that this number rarely exceeds three to four veterinarians per practice.
265. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 121 (1941)(milk).
266. Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414, 425 (1925).
267. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 120-21 (1941)(Congressional
power "includes authority to make like regulations for the marketing of intra-
state milk whose sale and competition with the interstate milk affects its price
structure so as in turn to adversely affect the Congressional regulation." Id. at
121).
268. 271 U.S. 414 (1925).
269. Id. at 425.
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stantially affect interstate commerce, at least where it can be shown
that the animals or their products (meat, milk, hide) travel in inter-
state commerce. Further support for this proposition comes from
other decisions involving activity arguably affecting interstate com-
merce for purposes of other federal legislation.
For example, in Mitchell v. Bowman,270 the defendant operated an
auction market where he sold and shipped livestock. The defendant
had several employees responsible for caring for and handling the
livestock as well as keeping records of the auction's business. A sub-
stantial number of the livestock sold at the auction were sold and
shipped to out-of-state buyers. The Secretary of Labor brought suit
alleging violations of minimum wage, overtime and other provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.2 71 Based on the facts, the district court
concluded that all the employees were engaged in interstate com-
merce for purposes of the jurisdictional requirement of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.272 Veterinarians serve a role similar to, or arguably
more important than, the role of an auction market's employee in
Mitchell; thus, veterinary care provided to animals shipped interstate
should satisfy the jurisdictional nexus for regulation under the Sher-
man Act.
The practical significance of any jurisdictional nexus depends on
the number of veterinarians involved in production animal agricul-
ture. Statistics of the American Veterinary Medical Association indi-
cate that many veterinarians would qualify under this analysis. Most
obvious are veterinarians who treat livestock intended for sale or
slaughter (food-animal veterinarians) and those who treat horses
(equine veterinarians). Clients of these veterinarians frequently ship
their animals interstate directly or indirectly through auctions or sale
barns. Approximately 23 percent of all veterinarians devote more
than half of their practice to serving these clients. Other veterinari-
ans, approximately 10 percent of the veterinary population, serve both
large- and small-animal clients.273 Thus, one-third of all veterinarians
are likely to affect interstate commerce and thus (at least arguably)
come within the scope of antitrust regulation. Small-animal practi-
tioners may also be included if a sufficient number of their clients
breed or raise pets destined for interstate commerce. In each case, the
nexus with interstate commerce will depend on the facts, such as the
percent of revenue derived from serving clients in this category or the
270. 131 F. Supp. 520 (M.D. Ala. 1954).
271. Id. at 521.
272. Id. at 523. See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)(application of wheat
quotas to farmers who grew wheat for own consumption).
273. J. Karl Wise, EconomicNote: 1987Incomes of U.S. Veterinarians, 194 J. Am. VET-
ER NARY MED. Ass'N. 563, 563 (table 1)(1989).
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number of animals treated.274
Failure to establish the nexus between the veterinary service and
interstate commerce forces the antitrust plaintiff to rely on the more
general factors used in the health care delivery cases. Little case law
indicates whether a court would consider those factors for small, pri-
vate practices. Furthermore, one of the factors, whether the plaintiff
receives federal subsidies (such as Medicare), is not relevant in the
veterinary context.275
Arguably, the best way to promote the goal of the Sherman Act as
well as the other federal antitrust laws is to provide liberal access to
their protections. To withhold jurisdiction from a group of professions
for whom state law protection has proven inadequate would under-
mine the policy against unreasonable restraints of trade. Implementa-
tion of that policy is particularly important when public health is at
issue.
2. The Rule of Reason
Once antitrust plaintiffs have satisfied the jurisdictional require-
ments, they must prove that the restraint at issue is unreasonable.
Section One of the Sherman Act states, "Every contract in restraint of
trade.., is declared to be illegal."27 6 Despite this broad language, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted Section One to apply only
to unreasonable restraints of trade.277 Nevertheless, "there are cer-
tain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
274. For instance, a veterinarian may provide medical service only to small herds of
cattle, yet this service may still satisfy the interstate commerce nexus. If animals
later are shipped from a small herd to a large feedlot or auction, the health status
of that herd may affect the health of all cattle in the stockyard as well as those
farther down the distribution chain. And if the stockyard ships animals in inter-
state commerce, the requisite nexus has been met.
275. Another consideration may be whether the plaintiff is "accredited" by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. Accreditation enables veterinarians to write and is-
sue health certificates for animals travelling in interstate commerce, as well as to
inspect the herds of origin. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 160-162 (1991), on accreditation of
veterinarians. One might argue that a covenant not to compete would limit the
number of accredited veterinarians in an area. This reduction would impede the
ability of the U.S.D.A. to detect and respond to disease outbreaks, thus adversely
affecting interstate commerce. Serving as an accredited veterinarian, however,
does not necessarily require private employment in a specific area, and a cove-
nant restricting future veterinary practice in a given area need not always limit
one's ability to serve as an accredited veterinarian. See, e.g., Tench v. Weaver, 374
P.2d 27 (Wyo. 1962)(covenant that prevented former employee from practicing
veterinary medicine did not extend to his service with the U.S.D.A. in disease
eradication program).
276. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
277. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 69-70 (1911); National Soc'y of
Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-89 (1978)("read literally, § 1 would
outlaw the entire body of private contract law").
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on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively pre-
sumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate in-
quiry."278  These agreements or practices are void per se. This
classification exists because certain practices are always or almost al-
ways unreasonable, leaving little need to decide each case indepen-
dently.279 The courts have held uniformly that covenants not to
compete do not qualify for per se treatment.28 0 A per se rule for cove-
nants not to compete is inappropriate because the federal courts have
had too little experience in covenant cases to determine that they are
"so pernicious as to lack any redeeming value,"281 and because non-
competition covenants serve a legitimate purpose by protecting an in-
dividual's commercial investment.282
Because the per se rule does not apply, the test for a covenant not
to compete is whether the covenant is "reasonably related to legiti-
mate interests of one of the parties."28 3 This rule of reason is a fact-
specific inquiry that ascertains whether a given practice "imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competition." 28 4 Though similar in lan-
guage to the common-law standard for covenants not to compete, the
rule of reason, like other federal antitrust law, emphasizes different
values.28 5 The state common-law standard seeks to minimize the op-
278. Northern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
279. Broadcasting Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979);
see also Northern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
Historically, only four types of activity have qualified as unreasonable per se:
price fixing, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210 (1940);
division of markets, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th
Cir. 1898), qff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); group boycotts, Fashion Origina-
tors Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1940); and tying arrangements,
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
280. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,688-89 (1978); Lektro-
Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 921
(1982); S.A. Consultants & Designers v. Butler Serv. Group, 720 F.2d 1553 (11th
Cir. 1983); Bradford v. New York Times, 501 F.2d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as modi-
fied, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
281. Baker's Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 730 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D.N.Y.
1990).
282. S.A. Consultants & Designers v. Butler Serv. Group, 720 F.2d 1553, 1560-61 (11th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Empire Gas, 537 F.2d 296, 307-08 (8th Cir. 1976), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
283. Carvel Corp. v. Eisenberg, 692 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also Lektro-
Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 921
(1982); S.A. Consultants & Designers v. Butler Serv. Group, 720 F.2d 1553 (11th
Cir. 1983); Newberger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057,1082 (2d Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Baker's Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 730 F.
Supp. 1209, 1215 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
284. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
285. See Sullivan, supra note 243, at 634. Professor Sullivan recognizes that such a
distinction has not been readily accepted by the courts. Id. at 632-34. See also
McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1378 (8th Cir. 1983)(a covenant
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pressive effect of covenants not to compete on the covenantor and the
public.286 The Sherman Act, on the other hand, focuses on the an-
ticompetitive effects of activities and their resulting effect on the rele-
vant market.2 87 This distinction has been blurred somewhat in the
area of non-competition covenants. In the early decision of United
States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.,288 Judge Taft adopted principles
from the common law to address a Sherman Act antitrust issue; he
noted that unreasonable contract restraints (including covenants not
to compete) will be void because they oppress the covenantor and be-
cause they result in monopoly.28 9 Later cases have read Addyston
Pipe to incorporate the rule of reason into Sherman Act analysis of
restraints of trade.290 Though the focus of analysis has varied since
Addyston Pipe, as one thoughtful commentator has indicated, the
proper focus of antitrust analysis is the economic benefit or detriment
of a given restraint.291
Under standard Sherman Act analysis, the plaintiff must show that
the challenged restraint has an anticompetitive effect in the relevant
market.292 This requirement also applies to covenants not to com-
pete.2 93 It is not sufficient, however, to show that the restraint hin-
dered only the plaintiff's ability to compete.2 94 Instead, the plaintiff
must show that the activity "resulted in damage to competition as a
in the sale of a business is reasonable if "limited in time, and geography, and ...
necessary to protect a buyer's interests").
286. Sullivan, supra note 243, at 633-39.
287. "Contrary to its name, the Rule does not open the field of Antitrust inquiry to
any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of
reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on com-
petitive conditions." National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688 (1978).
288. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Addyston Pipe
rejected the argument that competitors could lawfully set prices as long as the
agreed prices were reasonable. Id. at 282-83. After 1890 antitrust legislation, con-
tracts in restraint of trade are no longer merely void; they may violate criminal
law and lead to assessment of damages.
289. Id. at 282. See also Sullivan, supra note 243, at 632-34.
290. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
291. Sullivan, supra note 243, at 633.
292. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); H & B Equip-
ment Co. v. International Harvestor Co., 577 F.2d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 1978).
293. S.A. Consultants & Designers v. Butler Serv. Group, 720 F.2d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir.
1983); Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp. 718 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1983); Lektro-Vend
Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982);
Newberger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1035 (1978); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 308 (8th Cir.
1976), cert denied 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
294. S.A. Consultants & Designers v. Butler Serv. Group, 720 F.2d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir.
1983); R.W. Int'l, Inc. v. Borden Interamerica, Inc., 673 F.Supp. 654, 656 (D. Puerto
Rico 1987).
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whole in the relevant market,"295 a requirement that poses a signifi-
cant obstacle to the plaintiff seeking invalidation of a covenant not to
compete. A covenant, albeit anticompetitive as to the person re-
strained, can nevertheless promote competition by encouraging indi-
viduals to enter a field knowing they will be able to protect the fruits
of their labor.296
The key to establishing anticompetitive effect will be to show the
amount of competition in the relevant market. Whether the inquiry
focuses on the national market or the local market will affect the anal-
ysis. In veterinary medicine, the focus should be on the local area,
where the veterinary practice has a direct economic impact.297 In a
small market area, particularly with a small population, a covenant
not to compete may have a significant effect on competition. Presum-
ably a small area will have a relatively small number of veterinarians,
and the covenant will therefore restrain a relatively high percentage
of competition, even if only the plaintiff-covenantor is restrained.
Small market areas also have other impacts on market effect. For
example, ease of market entry has been a factor in determining
whether a competitive market exists.298 As the relevant market ex-
pands, the degree of open competition increases, making a restraint
less unreasonable because the restrained individual can enter the mar-
ket at a new location. Thus, the smaller the relevant market area, the
harder it is to enter the market. Despite the effects of covenants not
to compete on competition, however, most courts that have decided
this issue have held that the pro-competitive benefits provided by non-
competition covenants outweigh any anticompetitive effects. 299
Even if the plaintiff successfully proves an anticompetitive effect,
the courts still look to the purposes behind the covenant to determine
if those purposes fulfill some legitimate need. This analysis is similar
to the common-law analysis of covenants, with evaluation of the legiti-
macy of the interest protected and whether the restraint imposed is
reasonably tailored to protect that interest.300 If the covenant is over-
295. R.W. Int'l, Inc. v. Borden Interamerica, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D. Puerto Rico
1987).
296. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978).
297. See GTE Data Servs. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (M.D.
Fla. 1987)(market impact depends on "(1) size of relevant product and geo-
graphic markets; (2) the amount of competition foreclosed; and (3) how the acts
of defendant affected competition.").
298. United States v. Bestway Disposal Corp. 724 F. Supp. 62, 70 (W.D.N.Y. 1988);
United States v. Waste Mgt. Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
299. S.A. Consultants & Designers v. Butler Serv. Group, 720 F.2d 1553, 1562-64 (11th
Cir. 1983); Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1983); Lektro-Vend
Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982);
United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1122 (1977); Golden v. Kentile Floors, 512 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1975).
300. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978)(applying
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broad, it can be modified to impose a more reasonable restraint.3 0 1
Based on the analysis currently undertaken by courts applying the
Sherman Act, it would appear that a covenantor has little to gain from
using federal antitrust law in defense of a covenant case. There may
be instances, however, when just such a tactic may prove beneficial.
For instance, the assertion of a colorable federal antitrust counter-
claim will enable the covenantor to remove the original suit to federal
court rather than remain in state court. Further, the threat of addi-
tional litigation costs, because of the additional discovery and time re-
quired, may bring the covenantee to settlement sooner than if only a
state claim were involved. Finally, a covenantor might consider bring-
ing a federal antitrust claim in conjunction with a state claim for de-
claratory relief. By anticipating a future conflict involving a covenant
in this way, a covenantor may be able to place the covenantee into an
uncomfortable position, thus creating a more favorable settlement
environment.
In any event, one must consider the option of raising federal anti-
trust laws in litigation focused on a covenant not to compete. The ap-
propriateness of such a strategy will depend on a variety of factors
including the state court's approach to covenants, relevant state legis-
lation, the nature of the veterinary practice (in light of the jurisdic-
tional nexus for federal antitrust law), and the client's ability to afford
the added costs of such a claim.
V. CONCLUSION
Covenants not to compete play a major role in the business of vet-
erinary medicine, particularly by protecting a covenantee's valid inter-
est in client goodwill. Nonetheless, covenants have disadvantages, too.
They restrict veterinarians from practicing wherever they desire, and
they undermine the public's interest in having their animals examined
by the doctor of their choice. In a profession in which the respect and
goodwill of clients plays such a significant role, these restrictions on
the practice of veterinarians should be limited to the greatest extent
possible.
common law rule cited in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,
282-83 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), to alleged price-
fixing strategy (i.e., a ban on competitive bidding) in professional ethical rules);
McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1378 (8th Cir. 1983)("when the
goodwill of a business is sold along with its other assets, such a covenant, if rea-
sonably limited in time and geography, is necessary to protect a buyer's inter-
ests"); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
301. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 267 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 921 (1982): Newberger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1082 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Baker's Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice
Co., 730 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Courts and legislatures have addressed the tensions between the
interests of covenantors and covanantee with relatively inconsistent
results. No predictable, uniform standard adequately accommodates
the various interests in conflict. As a result, courts have relied on a
case-by-case analysis to determine the enforceability of covenants not
to compete. Though some states have relevant statutory provisions,
these have added little to the solution.
In light of increasing competition in veterinary medicine, it may be
important for courts to take a more active role in accommodating the
rights of the parties. Covenants not to compete should be closely tai-
lored to the protectable interest of the covenantee and the realities of
the modern veterinary industry. The practice of veterinary medicine
no longer means that a veterinarian performs all types of services on
all types of animals. The covenantee's real protectable interest may
be relatively narrow; therefore, a covenant should normally be limited
to the type of practice-for example, small animal, food animal,
equine-that the covenantor engaged in. As specialization increases in
the future, the scope of many covenants could eventually be limited
not only to a specific species, but also to a given specialty within that
species, such as cardiology or neurology. Geographic areas and time
periods should be no more extensive than actually required to protect
the covenantee's interest. Closely-tailored covenants will be en-
couraged if courts exercise their powers, where appropriate, to modify
excessive covenants to ensure only the narrowest reasonable protec-
tion for the covenantee.302 Only with adequate incentives will cove-
nantees be discouraged from sloppy drafting and from negligent or
intentional overreaching.
Moreover, the parties themselves must exercise more responsibil-
ity in drafting covenants that encompass only the restrictions that will
protect the covenantee without oppressing the covenantor. In negoti-
ating a covenant, the parties should also consider using covenant sub-
stitutes. In particular, the inclusion of a liquidated damages clause in
a veterinary contract may minimize unnecessary restraints and also
help reduce the need for litigation. Finally, drafting covenants that
place different, graduated restraints on veterinary activities will help
to tailor the covenant further to restrict only the activities that pose
the greatest risk to a covenantee. For example, a workable non-com-
petition agreement for an equine ambulatory practice might begin
with a covenant not to compete within a fifteen-mile radius of the cov-
enantee for a one-year period, during which the covenantor may not
accept any former clients. This restraint could be followed by a two-
or three-year period during which the covenantor may accept former
clients, but may not take active steps to solicit their business.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 187-192, for discussion of judicial modification
of overly broad covenants to promote careful drafting.
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The importance of covenants not to compete in protecting signifi-
cant business interests-in particular, client goodwill-means that
these covenants will continue to play a major role in veterinary con-
tracts. The present inconsistency in statutory and judicial approaches
to analysis and enforcement of these covenants suggests that uniform
standards are unlikely to be developed in the near future. Therefore,
veterinarians who are parties to covenants not to compete will have
the responsibility to draft covenants that adequately protect the cove-
nantee, but do not unjustly interfere with the covenantor's right to
practice veterinary medicine.
